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Has Non-U.S. Case Law Recognized a Legally 
Protected Autonomy Right? 
Nili Karako-Eyal* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
More than two decades have passed since the publication 
of one of the most salient articles ever written on the subject of 
informed consent: “From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: 
A New Protected Interest.”1 In this article, Marjorie Shultz, 
argued that a patient’s right to autonomy2 should be 
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 1. Marjorie Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New 
Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985). 
 2. The “patient’s right to autonomy” is a very complex concept. 
Although discussion of this term—its origin and meaning—exceeds the 
boundaries of this paper, a short clarification and its relation to other 
terms, principles and ideas is provided here. The term “patient’s right to 
autonomy” refers to the patient’s right to decide whether to undergo the 
proposed treatment, choose another treatment or refuse any treatment 
whatsoever. This decision should be intentional, freely accepted and 
based on relevant information. This right may be confined under special 
circumstances, i.e., medical emergency or incompetence. For a discussion 
of the conditions for an autonomy decision see, e.g., RUTH R. FADEN & TOM 
L. BEUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 238 (1986). 
The right to autonomy has several dimensions. First, it expresses 
philosophical theories—such as those developed by Kant, Berlin and 
Mill—having the principles of autonomy and liberty as their subjects. For 
a general description of these theories see, e.g., ALASDAIR  MACLEAN 
AUTONOMY, INFORMED CONSENT AND MEDICAL LAW–A RATIONAL CHALLENGE 
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recognized and respected as a distinct and separate legal 
interest.3 Her approach diverged from the prevailing U.S. 
position, according to which protection of this interest derived 
from defense of the interest in a person’s physical well-being or 
physical security.4 
Three decisions handed down since that article’s 
publication, the first by Australia’s Supreme Court, the second 
by the British House of Lords, and the third by Israel’s 
Supreme Court—Chappel,5 Chester,6 and Ali Daaka,7 
respectively—raise the question of whether Shultz’s approach 
has, in fact, been incorporated, either in whole or in part, into 
Anglo-America law beyond the United States.  8  
                                                          
9–22 (2009). Hence, the right to autonomy has some characteristics in 
common with these philosophical theories such as the absence of 
controlling influences exercised by others. See ONORA O’NEILL, AUTONOMY 
AND TRUST IN BIOETHICS 23, 28 (2002). Second, autonomy is a fundamental 
principle in medical ethics. It relates to physicians’ ethical obligation to 
respect their patients’ wishes and provide assistance in arriving at 
autonomous decisions. See TOM L. BEUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, 
PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 125 (4th ed. 1994). Third, it represents 
the rationale behind the legal doctrine of informed consent. According to 
this doctrine, adopted by American law in the mid-twentieth century, 
informed consent, as a pre-condition for the performance of any medical 
treatment, requires the patient to make an autonomous decision as to 
whether to undergo treatment. A doctor who treats a patient without 
respecting her right to autonomy—that is, without receiving her informed 
consent—can be charged with the tort of battery or negligence.  See, e.g., 
Maclean, supra note 2, at 190. The term “informed consent” was first used 
by an American court.  See  Salgo v. Stanford, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957) 
and is effectively identical to an autonomous decision to undergo medical 
treatment. Also related to the informed consent doctrine is the legal term 
“dignitary tort.” This term was suggested by legal scholars who believed 
that the law should recognize a new tort for the purpose of protecting the 
patient’s right to autonomy per se. See infra note 31.   
 3. See generally Shultz, supra note 1. 
 4. Id. at 219. 
 5. Chappel v. Hart (1998) 195 C.L.R. 232, available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1998/55.html. 
 6. Chester v. Afshar, [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 A.C. 134 (U.K.). 
 7. CA 2781/93 Ali Daaka v. Carmel Hosp., Haifa [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 
526. 
 8. Israeli law has long since adopted the doctrine of informed 
consent as promulgated in Anglo-American law.  Like Anglo-American 
courts, Israeli courts recognize the duty to obtain a patient’s consent and 
to provide her with information. See Ali Daaka, [1999] IsrSC at 543–52, 
564, 589; CA 434/94 Berman v. Moore Inst. for Med. Info., Ltd. [1997] 
IsrSC 51(4) 205, 212–14. They also accept the “reasonable patient” test 
when establishing the boundaries of the physician’s duty to inform the 
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In this article, I argue that although each of the decisions 
accords with Shultz’s suggestion that the interest protected in 
informed consent cases should be the patient’s right to 
autonomy, as distinct from physical well-being or physical 
security, none of these decisions fully reflects the position that 
a patient’s right to autonomy is a separate interest. Hence, 
none of these decisions accepts the idea that interference with 
the right to autonomy is in itself a harm that entitles plaintiffs 
to compensation. In addition, I argue that the main cause for 
American unwillingness and, perhaps, inability to adopt this 
idea is rooted in the characteristics of the tort of negligence, a 
cause of action available to patients claiming breach of the 
duty of disclosure. I further argue that Shultz’s thesis should 
be reconsidered. I argue that recognition of the right to 
autonomy as a separate interest is insufficient; in its place, the 
courts should recognize a new cause of action: interference 
with the right to autonomy. In addition, elaboration of this 
argument entails analysis of the issue of compensation to be 
awarded for interference with the right to autonomy. To 
support my argument, I analyze Rees,9 an additional decision 
handed down by the British House of Lords. 
There are seven parts to this paper. In the first part 
(Section II), following the introduction, I present Shultz’s 
thesis. The second part (Section III) begins with a description 
                                                          
patient. See Patient’s Rights Act, 1996, S.H. 327. Patients arguing a 
breach of the duty of disclosure can claim a cause of action under the tort 
of negligence. Patients wishing to claim physical injury suffered as a 
result of the medical treatment must prove injury causation and decision 
causation. That is, the medical procedure is a “but-for” cause of the 
physical injury, and the patient would have refused the proposed 
procedure if the relevant information had been disclosed. If, in addition to 
that cause of action, a patient wishes to claim that her consent to the 
treatment was never given, she can claim a cause of action under the tort 
of assault, so long as the respective treatment entailed physical force. See 
Ali Daaka, [1999] IsrSC at 543–52, 564, 589; Berman, [1997] IsrSC at 
205, 212–14. In 1996 Israel passed its Patient’s Rights Act, which 
anchored the doctrine of informed consent in comprehensive legislation.  
Patient’s Rights Act, 1996, S.H. 327. The law introduced no changes in 
the causes of action available to the patient prior to the law’s enactment, 
but it did add a new cause of action: breach of statutory duty. Id. at ch. 9. 
Developments in the doctrine of informed consent in Israeli law thus can 
contribute to the discussion of the doctrine’s evolution in Anglo-American 
law. 
 9. Rees v. Darlington Mem’l Hosp. NHS Trust, [2003] UKHL 52, 
[2004] 1 A.C. 309 (U.K), available at 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2003/52.html. 
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of the court rulings in the Chappel and the Chester cases, 
followed by a critical analysis of these decisions. Here I 
comment on whether the courts treated the patient’s right to 
autonomy as a separate interest, as Shultz has suggested. In 
the analysis, I attempt to identify the reasons for the positions 
taken by the courts. The third part of the paper (Section IV) 
deals with the question of what the courts should have done in 
both cases. I claim that the courts should have recognized a 
new head of damage—interference with the patient’s right to 
autonomy. I support my conclusions by referring to 
considerations of efficient deterrence, administrative costs and 
legal coherence. In the fourth part of the paper (Section V), I 
discuss the Ali Daaka decision, in which Israel’s Supreme 
Court ruled that interference with a patient’s right to 
autonomy is a designated damage. In the fifth part (Section VI) 
I claim that although Israel’s Supreme Court took an 
important step forward in this ruling, that step was imperfect. 
My comments focus on the subjective approach taken by the 
court and how it affected assessment of the compensation. The 
critical analysis of the decision is supplemented with the 
suggestion that adoption of an objective approach to 
compensation would have been preferable. In the sixth part 
(Section VII) of the paper, I examine whether the objective 
approach was adopted in the Rees case. A discussion of two 
versions of the objective approach—the objective-proprietary 
approach and the objective-tariff approach—ends this part. 
The paper’s seventh part (Section VIII) concludes with a 
summary of my thesis. 
II. SHULTZ’S THESIS: AUTONOMY AS A NEW PROTECTED 
INTEREST 
Shultz offered a critical analysis of contemporary law.10 
She argued that although the law recognizes the importance of 
the patient’s right to autonomy, this right is not recognized as 
a separate interest, worthy of protection in and of itself.11 The 
right to autonomy, to date, has been awarded protection only 
as a byproduct of two other different and separate legal 
interests: the right to physical security (an interest protected 
by the tort of assault) and the right to physical well-being (an 
                                                          
 10. Shultz, supra note 1, at 220–56. 
 11. Id. at 219–20. 
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interest protected by the tort of negligence).12 Shultz contended 
that this doctrinal structure has led to lacunae in the legal 
protection given the right to autonomy, and to a good degree of 
juridical incoherence.13 
In substantiating her argument that there are gaps in the 
legal protection of the right to autonomy, Shultz provided a 
series of examples: the confines placed on the physician’s duty 
to obtain patient consent and to fully inform her about 
invasive medical treatments;14 the adoption of a professional 
standard as the measure determining the scope of disclosure 
rather than adoption of the “reasonable patient” test, which 
more appropriately reflects the interest requiring protection;15 
the adoption of an objective test to determine causation as 
opposed to the autonomy protective test, that is, a subjective 
test that reflects consideration of the patient’s right to make 
autonomous decisions;16 and the difficulty of obtaining 
compensation for some categories of injury irrespective of the 
clear presence of injury.17 The solution to these holes and lack 
of protection is found, Shultz continued, in the legal 
recognition of the patient’s right to autonomy as a distinct and 
separate legal interest.18 
Shultz further argued that her approach would do more 
than provide full and comprehensive protection of the patient’s 
right to autonomy; it also would align with the legal stance 
taken in other branches of law, such as the constitutional 
protection of the right to privacy;19 the defense provided by 
civil law to other intangible interests (i.e., one’s right to a 
reputation and the right to freedom from emotional anguish)20 
and the imposition of broad disclosure obligations on all 
parties to a contract as well as on manufacturers (i.e., the duty 
to disclose potential dangers in a product or property).21 
The proposed approach, Shultz stated, also would respond 
to the characteristics of the medical system—that is, the 
                                                          
 12. Id. at 219. 
 13. See id. at 248–56. 
 14. Id. at 232–41. 
 15. Id. at 241–48. 
 16. Id. at 248–49. 
 17. Id. at 251–52. 
 18. Id. at 276–81. 
 19. Id. at 277–78. 
 20. Id. at 278–79. 
 21. Id. at 279–81. 
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presence of conflicts of interest as well as values dividing 
physicians from patients,22 and the lack of medical certainty, a 
factor that introduces considerable opportunities for 
discretionary choice with respect to medical treatment.23 This 
situation justifies the transfer of decision-making authority to 
the patient on the one hand, and recognition of the patient’s 
right to choose as a separate legal interest on the other.24 
When expanding upon her thesis, Schultz challenges the 
allegations that recognition of this new legal interest will cause 
harm to the patient’s health,25 raise medical costs,26 
unreasonably expand the physician’s liability, or cause damage 
to the physician’s status as a result of turning him into a 
technical purveyor of information. Recognition of an 
independent interest in patient autonomy, so she claims, 
would not broaden physicians’ liability, especially since the 
more that patients are informed and participate in decision 
making, the less the likelihood that they will file a claim.27 As 
to the fear of damaging the physician’s status, Shultz contends 
that this fear is baseless since the doctor remains the 
responsible advisor to the patient.28 
Shultz is willing to recognize a new head of damage—
interference with the right to autonomy.  From her perspective, 
not only is the patient’s right to autonomy to be recognized as 
an interest separate and independent from the interests of 
physical well-being and physical security, any interference 
with the exercise of this right is to be considered sufficient to 
award the patient compensation even if that interference does 
not result in physical injury.29 
Before continuing, I would like to comment about my 
                                                          
 22. Id. at 272–75. 
 23. Id. at 270–72. This argument requires some explanation. Shultz 
argues that medical uncertainty destroys the possibility of a single correct 
answer, leaving many answers in competition with one another. In this 
situation, choosing among alternative courses implicates the patient’s 
individual characterizes. Conflicts of interest, as well as values separating 
physicians from patients, undermine the doctor’s claim to authority and 
intensify the patient’s right to autonomy. Id. 
 24. See id. at 276. 
 25. Id. at 292–95. 
 26. Id. at 295–96 
 27. Id. at 296–97. 
 28. Id. at 297–98. 
 29. Id. at 290–91. 
KARAKO-EYAL N.  Has Non-U.S. Case Law Recognized a Legally Protected Autonomy 
Right?  MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 671-726. 
2009] LEGALLY PROTECTED AUTONOMY RIGHT 677 
choice of Shultz’s article and the decision to review her ideas at 
this point of time. 
Shultz is not the only scholar who has adopted this 
approach.  Others also have argued that separate protection 
should be given to the patient’s right to autonomy so that any 
interference with this right will entitle the plaintiff to 
compensation.30 
Yet Shultz’s thesis is no doubt the most comprehensive of 
them all. As a result, her article is often mentioned as a 
prominent paper in the legal literature dealing with the issue of 
dignitary torts. For these reasons, I have chosen Shultz’s 
thesis as the opening for my discussion 
Indeed twenty-five years have passed since the publication 
of Shultz’s article. During those years, the doctrine of informed 
consent has been revised.31 Yet, I believe that Shultz’s critique 
continues to be applicable inasmuch as no changes have been 
made in American law regarding the interest protected. A 
review of the non-U.S. cases, handed down in the last decade, 
returned my attention to Shultz’s thesis and its continued if 
not greater relevance. I believe that these cases require a new 
observation of Shultz’s thesis and of American law. My article 
offers such observation. 
                                                          
 30. See, e.g., JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 69–
70, 79 (1984); JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 122–23 (9th ed. 1998); 
Alan Meisel, A ‘Dignitary Tort’ as a Bridge Between The Idea of Informed 
Consent and The Law of Informed Consent, in MEDICINE AND THE LAW 157–
58, 163–64 (Bernand M. Dickens ed., 1993); Joseph Goldstein, For Harold 
Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed 
Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 691 (1975); Jay Katz, 
Informed Consent—A Fairy Tale? Law’s Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137, 
160–62 & n. 76 (1977); Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed 
Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 
365–67 (1999); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 
188–90 (1992); Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor 
Ordered, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 313, 330 (2002); Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. 
Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of 
Justiciable Causation, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 609, 616, 649, 651–52, 
665. 
 31. Most of these revisions concern the duty of disclosure. For a 
description of this changes see e.g., MICHAEL A. JONES, MEDICAL 
NEGLIGENCE  652–74 (4th ed. 2008). 
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III. THE CHAPPEL AND CHESTER DECISIONS 
A.  THE CHAPPEL DECISION 
The facts of Chappel, ultimately decided by the Supreme 
Court of Australia, are quite simple. The plaintiff, Mrs. Hart, 
underwent surgery at the hands of the defendant, Dr. Chappel, 
for the purpose of resolving a medical condition in her throat.32  
The defendant had not warned the plaintiff of the mild risk of 
damage to her vocal cords that was inherent in the procedure, 
even though the plaintiff had articulated an interest in the 
risks posed by the procedure, especially with reference to her 
voice.33 Though the surgery was performed with reasonable 
skill, this risk was realized and the plaintiff, left with a 
damaged voice, was forced to leave her place of employment.34 
At the time that the surgery was performed, it was treated 
by the doctor as an elective procedure.35 The plaintiff’s medical 
condition, however, was “relentlessly progressive.”36 Hence, 
had she not undergone the procedure then, she eventually 
would have had to undergo the procedure anyway, which was 
considered to be the sole remedy available for her complaint.37  
Accordingly, the court decided that even had the plaintiff been 
informed of the mild risk of injury to her voice as a result of 
the procedure, the surgery would eventually have been 
performed.38 Moreover, the risk to her voice was associated 
with procedures of this type, irrespective of when they were 
performed and the identity of the surgeon.39 
The plaintiff argued that had the defendant informed her 
of the risk inherent in the procedure, she would not have 
acquiesced to his performance of the surgery at that time.40  
The court accepted as credible the plaintiff’s argument that she 
would have sought another opinion and would have selected a 
                                                          
 32. Chappel v. Hart (1998) 195 C.L.R. 232, 233, available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1998/55.html. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 253. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 237. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 239–240, 258. 
 39. Id. at 239–41. 
 40. Id. at 233. 
KARAKO-EYAL N.  Has Non-U.S. Case Law Recognized a Legally Protected Autonomy 
Right?  MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 671-726. 
2009] LEGALLY PROTECTED AUTONOMY RIGHT 679 
more experienced surgeon to perform the surgery.41 The 
plaintiff further argued that considering the fact that the 
defendant had reneged on his duty to disclose the respective 
risk, however mild it was thought to be, he should be required 
to pay damages for injuring her voice based on the tort of 
negligence and breach of contract.42  Although the charge of 
negligence, based upon the breach of duty of disclosure, 
aroused no debate,43 the issue of causation raised serious 
difficulties. 
The source of the difficulty rested on the fact that the 
plaintiff’s medical condition was expected to deteriorate and 
that her condition could be treated solely by this procedure.44  
Therefore, as the plaintiff herself admitted, even if the risk 
inherent in the surgery had been disclosed, she would have 
agreed to undergo the surgery at some point.45 Moreover, the 
risk of injury was inherent in the procedure; the plaintiff would 
therefore have been exposed to that risk whenever the surgery 
was performed.46 
Three of the sitting judges ruled in favor of the plaintiff; 
they stated that she had proved causation.47 Justice Gaudron 
grounded her individual opinion in four fundamental 
arguments. First, the defendant was required to fulfill his duty 
of disclosure to the plaintiff and inform her, in detail, of the 
foreseeable risk inherent in the procedure.48 The defendant 
had ignored his duty, and the said risk did indeed materialize; 
hence, his breach of this duty could be considered to have 
                                                          
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 235. 
 43. The court’s ruling in the first instance determined that the 
defendant had breached the duty of disclosure with respect to the plaintiff 
and thus had been negligent. Id. at 254. The parties did not appeal the 
court’s decision in this matter. Id. at 254–55. For a discussion of the 
court’s ruling with respect to the duty of disclosure imposed on 
physicians, see Ian Freckelton, The New Duty to Warn, [1999] ALT. L.J. 4, 
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AltLJ/1999/4.html; 
Owen Bradfield, At the Heart of Chappel v Hart: A Warning About 
Warning!, http://www.alsa.asn.au/files/acj/2000/chappel_hart.html 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2009). 
 44. Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 237. 
 45. Id. at 258. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 239, 260, 278. For an analysis of the judges’ decisions in 
this case see, e.g., Peter Cane, A Warning About Causation, 115 L.Q. REV. 
21 (1999). 
 48. Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 238–39. 
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either caused or contributed to the damage unless some legal 
rule or legal consideration could justify a different 
conclusion.49 Second, no sufficient reason could be identified 
that might justify an alternative decision. The damage the 
plaintiff suffered was not only exposure to risk; it also entailed 
the physical injury suffered de facto.50 Moreover, even if the 
plaintiff did take it upon herself to face the risk inherent in the 
procedure at some future date, she was nonetheless 
unprepared to do so at the time the defendant had performed 
the surgery.51 Third, had the defendant informed the plaintiff 
of the risk, she might not have submitted to the surgery at that 
time.52 Therefore, considering the low probability of the risk, 
she may very well not have suffered the physical injury at all, 
and the defendant’s breach of the duty of disclosure could be 
considered a contributing factor to the injury suffered.53 
Fourth, although the risk was independent of the time of the 
procedure’s performance and the identity of the surgeon, the 
probability of realizing that risk would have declined had the 
surgery been performed by a more experienced and skilled 
surgeon.54 
Contrary to his colleague, Justice Gummow did not base 
his opinion on the assumption that the procedure’s 
performance by another, more skilled and experienced surgeon 
would have reduced the risk inherent in the procedure.55 This 
divergence, however, did not prevent him from concurring with 
Justice Gaudron that the plaintiff had, indeed, established 
causation.56 At the core of his opinion is an approach stating 
that the issue of causation requires reference to the scope and 
purpose of the relevant legal rule.57 In cases like Chappel 
responses to the question of causation therefore relates to the 
substance and purpose of the duty of disclosure, a duty 
derived from the patient’s right to make a decision about 
whether to accept a proposed treatment. The purpose of this 
                                                          
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 239–40. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 240. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 241. 
 55. See id. at 260–62 (Gummow, J., concurring). 
 56. Id. at 260. 
 57. Id. at 255–57. 
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duty is to enable the patient to make informed decisions on the 
basis of relevant information.58 Justice Gummow further 
stressed that the materialized risk, which was at the root of the 
plaintiff’s injury, is the same risk that should have been 
revealed to her by force of the duty of disclosure as well as the 
rationale behind that duty’s existence.59 An additional 
consideration was the fact that the risk of injury to her voice 
was especially meaningful to the plaintiff, as demonstrated by 
her research into the subject.60  Given these circumstances, 
the judge was persuaded that it would be unjust to discharge 
the defendant of his responsibility to pay damages on the basis 
of some hypothetical scenario regarding how events would 
have unfolded had the plaintiff undergone the procedure at 
another time and at the hands of another surgeon.61 Given the 
facts indicating that if the surgery had been performed at 
another time and by a more expert surgeon the risk to the 
plaintiff would have declined considerably (a fact indicating 
that the “but for” test applied), Justice Gummow concluded 
that the plaintiff had proven causation.62 
Positioning himself between the approaches taken by the 
two other members of the majority, Justice Kirby, also ruled in 
favor of the plaintiff.63 He argued that the common-sense 
approach to causation supported a decision in favor of 
awarding compensation to the plaintiff, as did the substance 
and purpose of the duties violated in this case: the duty of 
disclosure and the duty to respond to all questions honestly.64 
Even though these duties impose heavy burdens on 
physicians, they are integral to the law; it is therefore fitting 
that infringements of those duties will invite legal 
consequences.65 Justice Kirby was convinced that this was 
especially true in the current case. The plaintiff had clearly 
expressed her fears, and had the defendant responded to those 
fears, it is decidedly possible that the plaintiff would not have 
undergone the procedure at the given date and would not have 
suffered the respective injuries—especially considering the 
                                                          
 58. Id. at 256–57. 
 59. Id. at 257–58. 
 60. Id. at 257. 
 61. Id. at 262. 
 62. Id. at 256–57, 260–262. 
 63. Id. at 276–79 (Kirby, J., concurring). 
 64. Id. at 276. 
 65. Id. at 277. 
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rarity of the risk and her contention that she would have 
turned to a more skilled and experienced physician.66 In 
consideration of all the circumstances, Justice Kirby was 
convinced that the damage in this case was caused, not by 
unrelated intervening problems, but solely by the physician’s 
failure to inform the patient.67 Hence, as the defendant had 
not complied with the burden of persuasion68 regarding 
causation, Justice Kirby ruled in favor of the plaintiff.69 
B. THE CHESTER DECISION 
The factual basis of Chester, a case decided by the British 
House of Lords, closely resembles that of Chappel. In this case 
the plaintiff had been suffering severe back pain.70 The 
defendant, a neurosurgeon to whom the plaintiff had turned 
for counseling, recommended that the defendant undergo 
surgery.71 Three days later, the surgery was performed with 
the plaintiff’s agreement.72 Although the procedure was 
performed with reasonable skill, the plaintiff suffered 
considerable damage to her nervous system in the course of 
the surgery and was left partially paralyzed.73 The risk of such 
injury was anticipated in one percent to two percent of the 
cases.74 Claiming the tort of negligence, the plaintiff argued 
that the defendant had failed to warn her of the risk.75 The 
plaintiff also stated that had she been given the risk 
information, she would have first sought another opinion 
before agreeing to performance of the procedure at that time.76  
Nevertheless, the court did not rule (and was not requested to 
rule) on whether the plaintiff would have undergone the 
                                                          
 66. Id. at 277–78. 
 67. Id. at 278. 
 68. In Australian law as in American law, the onus to prove causation 
is on the plaintiff. Id. at 270. Yet, Justice Kirby ruled that once the 
plaintiff demonstrates that a breach of duty had accrued, closely followed 
by damage, a prima facie casual connection is established. In this case, 
the burden of proof would be shifted to the defendant. Id. at 273. 
 69. Id. at 278–79. 
 70. Chester v. Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 A.C. 134, 140 (U.K.). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 142. 
 73. Id. at 140. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 138. 
 76. Id. at 141. 
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surgery at all, or whether there was any way to reduce the risk 
of injury.77 However, the court did rule that the risk remained 
constant, independent of when the procedure was performed 
and independent of the identity of the surgeon.78 In other 
words, the court found that the plaintiff was exposed to the 
identical risk—in terms of the probability of its materialization 
and its nature—even if the surgery had been performed on a 
different day or by a more experienced surgeon. 
Similar to the Chappel case, the question of negligence 
raised no obstacles in Chester,79 and the debate centered on 
the question of causation. Because the plaintiff was unable to 
establish that she would have completely avoided undergoing 
the surgery, and because her entire argument revolved around 
her deferral of the procedure, though deferral that would not 
have altered the risk inherent in the procedure, the question of 
causation arose.80 
The three judges submitting the majority opinion—Lord 
Steyn, Lord Hope, and Lord Walker—were persuaded that the 
plaintiff had proven causation.81 Although some minor 
differences can be found in their separate opinions, the 
following arguments were common to all three. 
 First, establishment of causation is an issue pertaining 
to legal policy.82 Hence, when establishing causation and thus 
assigning legal liability, identification of the correlated rights 
and duties of both parties, as well as of the relevant legal 
interests, is required.83  The protected interest in Chester was 
the right of every adult to make a medical decision having the 
                                                          
 77. Id. at 140–41. 
 78. Id. at 141. 
 79. The court in the first instance ruled that the defendant had 
breached the duty of disclosure owed to the plaintiff and was thus 
negligent. This decision was not appealed. Id. at 148. For a discussion of 
the court’s ruling with respect to the duty of disclosure as imposed on 
physicians, see David Meyers, Chester v. Afshar: Sayonara, Sub 
Silentio,Sidaway?, in FIRST DO NO HARM: LAW, ETHICS AND HEALTHCARE 255 
(Sheila A.M. McLean ed., 2006). 
 80. Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 141. 
 81. See id. at 134. 
 82. See, e.g., id. at 139, 146, 158, 162–63. 
 83. See., e.g., id. at 162–63 (Hope, J., concurring) (“The function of the 
law is to enable rights to be vindicated and to provide remedies when 
duties have been breached. Unless this is done the duty is a hollow one, 
stripped of all practical force and devoid of all content.”). 
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potential to influence her life, which is a basic right.84 The 
physician’s duty was to avoid providing any treatment without 
first receiving the patient’s informed consent.  The physician’s 
duty fulfilled two purposes: the first, prevention of realization 
of risks that the patient is not prepared to take upon herself; 
the second, showing the appropriate respect and concern for 
the patient’s right to autonomy and dignity.85 
Second, the risk materialized was the same risk about 
which the defendant was to warn the plaintiff.86 Had the 
defendant not failed to warn the plaintiff of the possible danger 
of injury, she would have delayed the procedure, the injury 
would not have taken place when it did, and the probability 
that the injury would have been suffered on another occasion 
would have been lowered.87 
Third, considerations of policy and corrective justice 
supported vindication of the patient’s right to autonomy and to 
dignity, and thus a slight departure from the traditional rules 
of causation.88 This slight departure was expressed in the 
court’s decision that causation had been proven despite the 
fact that, in light of the circumstances of the case—the plaintiff 
could not avoid the surgery and the risk was inherent in the 
procedure—there were doubts as to whether the “but-for” test 
had been established. In the current case, the court continued, 
the defendant owed duty of disclosure to the patient and the 
duty was breached, and the resulting harm fell within the 
sphere of the duty.89 Assignment of theoretical meaning and 
practical relevance to the duty imposed on physicians and to 
the patient’s right to autonomy thus demanded that the 
defendant compensate the plaintiff for the injuries suffered.90 
C.  A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CHAPPEL AND CHESTER 
                                                          
 84. See, e.g., id. at 162. 
 85. Id. at 138–39, 142, 144, 148–49, 164. This aspect of the decision, 
that is, the idea that the foundations of the duty of disclosure rest on the 
patient’s right to autonomy, is also mentioned in later decisions. See, e.g., 
Khalid v. Barnet & Chase Farm Hosp. NHS Trust, [2007] EWHC 664 (QB) 
(U.K.), ¶¶ 63–67, available at 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2007/644.html. 
 86. See Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 164 (Walker, J., concurring). 
 87. Id. at 165. 
 88. Id. at 162–63. 
 89. Id. at 163. 
 90. Id. 
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DECISIONS 
A superficial reading of the decisions gives the impression 
that the courts adopted Shultz’s thesis in both cases.  By 
placing  the patient’s right to autonomy at the center of their 
deliberations, the courts  diverged from  traditional rules of 
causation, and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.  Each decision 
recognized the importance of the right to autonomy as well as 
autonomy as an interest to be considered when ruling on 
whether there was causation. This position motivated the 
courts  to devise a creative solution  enabling them to award 
compensation  to plaintiffs who had suffered interference with 
their right to autonomy  thus eliminating or alleviating the 
difficulty of proving  causation.  Especially important are the 
courts’ rulings stating that the correct approach to be taken in 
cases of this type involves correcting the injustice done in the 
form of interference with the plaintiffs’ right to autonomy. The 
judges were thus persuaded that any other approach would 
not contribute to credible judicial policy nor serve the interests 
of corrective justice.91 
Yet a careful review of the decisions soon reveals the 
cracks in this initial impression. What first appears to be the 
courts’ adoption of the Shultz thesis quickly evaporates.  
Although both decisions appear to give considerable weight to 
the right to autonomy in judicial rulings, and even though the 
courts’ objective was to protect this right, the interest 
protected was, in fact, the patient’s right to physical well-being 
rather than to autonomy. Moreover, the degree to which these 
decisions granted any protection to the patient’s right to 
autonomy per se was only partial.  In the following, I explain 
                                                          
 91. In her article, Shultz herself dealt with how the issue of causation 
would be affected by the thesis she had suggested. Shultz, supra note 1, 
at 286–91. She was confident that adoption of her position would lead to 
amelioration of strict rules of causation through rejection of the balance of 
probabilities test and adoption of the probability (proportional) test. Id. 
According to the latter test, the court is to assess the probability that a 
patient would have chosen an alternative therapy had there not been any 
interference with her right to autonomy.  Id. at 287. The patient would 
then be entitled to compensation on the basis of this assessment.  Id. The 
advantage of the probability test lies in its power to prevent rejection of 
claims based on the argument that the plaintiff had not complied with the 
burden of proof—according to the balance of probabilities test—that her 
decision would have been different had her right to autonomy not suffered 
interference.  Id. Such a phenomenon is common in claims based on the 
doctrine of informed consent. See id. at 286–87. 
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why. 
First, the courts in both Chester and Chappel ruled that 
compensation was to be awarded to the plaintiffs for the 
physical injuries they had suffered as a result of the treatment 
received despite the absence of causality between the breach of 
the duty of disclosure and the injury sustained or, at the very 
least, the presence of serious doubt regarding the existence of 
such causality.92 Although both courts portrayed their rulings 
as easing the traditional rules of causation, the fact is that 
they did not modify these rules but, in effect, sought causation 
where it was nonexistent.93 
We can conclude from the considerations voiced, as 
reported above, that resting at the heart of the majorities’ 
decisions in both cases was the assumption that had violation 
of the duty of disclosure not occurred, the plaintiffs would not 
have suffered any physical injury because they would have 
delayed the procedure and because of the rarity of the 
subsequent attendant risk.94 This line of reasoning enabled the 
judges to “temper” the traditional rules of causation and to 
base their ruling in favor of the plaintiffs on legal policy 
considerations. 
This assumption, however, was inherently false. The 
probability that some medical risk, however small, will 
materialize remains constant irrespective of the timing of a 
                                                          
 92. See Chappel v. Hart (1998) 195 C.L.R. 232, 242–44, available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1998/55.html; Chester, 
[2005] 1 A.C. at 162–63. 
 93. See Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 255–57; Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 162–
63.  Criticism of these decisions in this vein was expressed by numerous 
legal scholars. See, e.g., Kumaralingam Amirthalingam, Medical Non-
Disclosure, Causation and Autonomy, 118 L.Q. REV. 540, 542 (2002); 
Bradfield, supra note 43; see supra text accompanying notes 57–66; 
Jeremy Clarke, Causation in Chappel v. Hart: Common Sense or 
Coincidence?, 6 J.L. & MED. 335, 346–47 (1999); Charles Foster, It Should 
Be, Therefore It Is, 154 NEW L.J. 1644, 1644–45 (2004); Tony Honoré, 
Medical Non-Disclosure, Causation and Risk: Chappel v. Hart, 7 TORTS L.J. 
1, 7–8 (1999); Marc Stauch, Taking the Consequences for Failure to Warn 
of Medical Risks, 63 MOD. L. REV. 261, 266–67 (2000); Stephen M. 
Waddams, Causation, Physicians and Disclosure of Risks, 7 TORT L. REV. 
5, 6 (1999). 
 94. As we have seen, this assumption also stood at the heart of 
Justice Gaudron’s decision in Chappel, as well as Justice Kirby’s, which 
was likewise based on the argument that the performance of the 
procedure by a more competent surgeon might have reduced the inherent 
risk. See Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 242, 277. 
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procedure. The example of a game of roulette, as Justice 
Hoffman noted in Chester, provides a good demonstration of 
this flaw: if the probability that the number seven would come 
up in a roulette game is one to thirty-seven, this probability 
remains the same even if the gambler leaves the casino 
without placing a bet and returns later to bet once more.95 
Hence, the assumption that transmission of information to 
the plaintiffs would have led them to defer their respective 
surgeries and thereby prevent the physical injury they suffered 
is fallacious.  It was therefore erroneous to conclude that 
breach of the duty of disclosure was a “but for” cause of the 
plaintiffs’ injuries. Such injuries were likely to have been 
suffered, with the same probability, whenever the procedure 
was performed.96 
The sole assumption warranting the conclusion that non-
disclosure had caused the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs 
was that had the surgery been performed by a different, more 
experienced and skilled surgeon, the risk inherent in the 
procedure would have been reduced.97 Yet this argument was 
not raised by the plaintiff in the Chester case and so became 
irrelevant to the court’s decision. Although the argument was 
raised in Chappel, only one of the sitting judges—Justice 
Gaudron—based her ruling on these grounds.98  Justice Kirby 
mentioned such a possibility but was insufficiently clear about 
its factual aspects.99 Furthermore, however much Justice 
Kirby might have found this argument acceptable, it 
represented only one in a range of his considerations and was 
certainly not the main reason for his decision.100 The third 
member of the majority, Justice Gummow, totally ignored this 
argument.101 
                                                          
 95. Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 147 (Hoffman, J., dissenting). 
 96. For more on this argument, see IAN FRECKELTON & DANUTA 
MENDELSON, CAUSATION IN LAW AND MEDICINE 394 (2002). 
 97. For more on this argument, see id. at 394. 
 98. Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 241–42. 
 99. Id. at 277–78 (Kirby, J., concurring). 
 100. See id. at 276. 
 101. Id. at 255–63. For a similar description of the judges’ approaches 
concerning this factual issue, see Stauch, supra note 93, at 265–67. For a 
more extreme approach stating that all the judges in the majority would 
have ruled in favor of the existence of causation, even if the probability of 
the risk materializing had been identical under the hands of a more 
skilled and experienced surgeon, see FRECKELTON  & MENDELSON, supra 
note 96, at 395–96. By contrast, in a later decision reached by Justice 
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Given the assumption that even if the surgery had been 
performed at another time and by a different surgeon the 
attendant risk would have remained similar, we have no choice 
but to conclude that the plaintiffs were unable to prove that 
but for infringement of the duty of disclosure, they would not 
have suffered any damage. In other words, we find it difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that causation was not substantiated or, 
at the very least, that its existence was in serious doubt 102.  
Yet the Chappel and Chester courts both chose to 
compensate the plaintiffs for the physical injury suffered. Like 
their predecessors, they applied the doctrine of informed 
consent as alternative grounds for awarding compensation for 
physical injuries;103 only now the awards were made in cases 
arousing serious doubt regarding causation. 
Interestingly, both the Chappel and Chester courts chose 
to base their decisions on the significance of the right to 
                                                          
Gummow, he described the rulings of the two other judges in the Chappel 
majority—Justices Gaudron and Kirby—as having been based on the 
assumption that the risk would have declined had the surgeon been more 
skilled and experienced. See Rosenberg v. Percival (2001) 205 C.L.R. 434, 
464 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2001/18.html.  John 
Gunson developed an interesting opinion in this regard, specifically, that 
although the plaintiff succeeded in proving that the probability of risk 
would have declined had a more skillful and experienced surgeon 
performed the procedure, her argument would still have been insufficient 
to prove causation. This was so in absence of evidence that the harm 
suffered had resulted from the increased risk to which she was exposed as 
opposed to the risk inherent in the procedure. See John Gunson, 
Turbulent Causal Waters: The High Court, Causation and Medical 
Negligence, 9 TORT L. REV. 53, 77 (2001). 
 102. Most judges in the minority opinions of these cases came to the 
same conclusion. See, e.g., Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 286–87; Chester, 
[2005] 1 A.C. at 147. 
 103. The main and immediate purpose of the doctrine of informed 
consent had been the extension of physicians’ liability in addition to the 
guarantee of compensation to a far greater number of patients who had 
suffered injury in the wake of medical treatment. This phenomenon 
represented part of a more general trend toward ensuring appropriate 
compensation to a larger number of injured parties and the broadening of 
liability to entities known to take advantage of the distribution of damage. 
For more on this argument and a description of the development of 
informed consent, see Alan Meisel, The Expansion of Liability for Medical 
Accidents: From Negligence to Strict Liability by Way of Informed Consent, 
56 NEB. L. REV. 51 (1977); IZHAK ENGLARD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW 
161–63 (1993); Gerald Robertson, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 
97 L.Q. REV. 102, 109–12 (1981). 
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autonomy and on their aspirations to endow that right with 
the appropriate protection as well as with practical force. Yet 
this firm, rational basis for the decisions totally contradicts the 
cases’ final outcomes. Instead of identifying the actual injury 
suffered by the plaintiffs—interference with the right to 
autonomy— and awarding the plaintiffs compensation for this 
damage, the courts chose to award compensation for their 
physical injuries even though neither plaintiff was able to 
prove, as required, causation between the non-disclosure and 
the harm suffered.104 
Another interesting observation is that the Chappel court 
was also offered a theory—the theory of loss of chance—that 
might have led to awarding compensation for the injury to the 
plaintiff’s right to autonomy. This theory was suggested by the 
defendant, who argued that the injury suffered by the plaintiff 
was not physical but, rather, the lost chance of having the 
surgery performed by another physician and at a different 
time.105 Although the defendant’s objective in proposing this 
argument was to deny the plaintiff any compensation, based 
on the contention that the lost chance had no value, the court 
could have accepted the notion and awarded compensation 
based on interference with the plaintiff’s autonomy,106 as I now 
                                                          
 104. It is worth mentioning in this regard the approach taken by 
Justice Hoffman in Chester.  Justice Hoffman was persuaded that the 
plaintiff had not proven causation. Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 147. 
Nevertheless, given the fact that the plaintiff’s right to autonomy had 
suffered interference, he considered ruling in favor of a modest solatium. 
Id. He himself expressed no enthusiasm regarding this possibility, 
whether due to the difficulty of determining the appropriate amount of 
compensation, or whether due to the fact that the high costs of the 
proceedings made tort law an inappropriate vehicle for allocating damages 
in such cases. Id. The idea of awarding the plaintiff a sum of money in the 
form of a solatium in cases where the right of autonomy had been 
abrogated but where there was no possibility of proving causation was 
raised in a later ruling. The idea was briefly discussed by the court but 
rejected for procedural reasons. Review of statements made by the court 
indicates that the idea was considered radical, which induced the court to 
act with circumspection. See, e.g., SEM v. Mid Yorkshire Hosps., [2005] 
EWHC (QB), B3, [59]–[60], available at 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2005/B3.html. 
 105. Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 237–38. 
 106. The defendant claimed that because the injury suffered by the 
plaintiff was the lost chance of undergoing the surgery at a different time 
and with another surgeon, and because the risk inherent in the procedure 
had remained constant irrespective of when it was performed or the 
surgeon’s identity, the lost chance lacked any value. Id. This argument 
raises the question of how to assess compensation for a lost chance, an 
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make clear. 
The right to autonomy refers to the right to make decisions 
that reflect the values and preferences of the decision-
maker.107 In order to realize this right, the decision-maker has 
to receive all the information she considers relevant. 
Transmission of partial information undermines the prospect 
that the decision-maker’s choice will reflect her values and 
preferences, and thus her right to autonomy. 
Returning to Chappel, it follows that a close connection 
can be established between the award of compensation to the 
plaintiff for her lost chance that the surgery would be 
performed at another time and by a different surgeon, choices 
that more accurately reflect her preferences, and the award of 
compensation for the interference with her right to autonomy. 
Hence, the court was given, in effect, an opportunity to develop 
a liability theory centered on the right to autonomy as opposed 
to the interest in physical well-being. It appears, however, that 
the court rejected the theory of lost chance108 without 
pursuing development of the alternative idea, as I have 
suggested. 
The approach adopted by the courts, that is, their focus on 
the physical injury suffered by the two plaintiffs, together with 
their avoidance of the fact that the real damage suffered was 
interference with their right to autonomy, was elaborated not 
only in their final decisions but in the substantiating 
arguments as well. As we shall soon see, this reasoning had 
undesirable outcomes—the extension of only partial protection 
                                                          
issue discussed later with reference to assessment of compensation for 
interference with the right to autonomy. We can venture here that the 
conclusion reached by the defendant was not inescapable, and that a 
different theory regarding the assessment of compensation would have 
allowed award of compensation under these conditions as well. 
 107. See Shultz, supra note 1, at 220. 
 108. Rejection of the theory of lost chance rested on several 
considerations: That the injury actually suffered was a physical injury, 
that no duty was imposed upon the physician to provide the plaintiff with 
an opportunity for the procedure to be performed by a more skilled 
surgeon, and that he was not required to refer her to a more skilled 
surgeon. See Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 237–38, 88. Furthermore, recognition 
of the lost chance as an injury demanding compensation is constrained by 
the difficulty of making a reasonable assessment of the damage. See id. at 
274–75, 78. Finally, from a procedural prospective, the plaintiff demanded 
compensation for her physical injury and not for the lost chance. Id. at 
278–79. 
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to the right to autonomy. 
Considerable stress was placed in both Chappel and 
Chester on the fact that the risk against which the defendants 
were to warn the plaintiffs had materialized in the form of 
physical injury.109 In effect, it was the chain of events 
beginning with the breach of disclosure and concluding in 
realization of physical injury that made it inconceivable, 
according to the judges in the majority, to free the defendants 
of liability and to deny the plaintiffs any compensation.110 As 
stated, the judges in the majority held that such outcomes 
contradict corrective justice, and threaten to empty the duty of 
disclosure of its meaning. 
Yet these considerations, however intuitive and rational 
they may appear to be, are problematic. In both cases it was 
agreed by the courts that the inherent risk to the plaintiffs was 
mild. In fact, in Chappel, the said risk was described as 
rare.111 Moreover, the courts in both cases stressed that had 
the two plaintiffs undergone the surgery at a later date, it was 
quite likely that they would not have been harmed.112 The 
injury’s realization was therefore a matter of bad luck, with a 
low probability of transpiring. Yet, the breach of the duty of 
disclosure, like the injury to the plaintiffs’ right to autonomy, 
would have remained effectively the same whether or not the 
risks had materialized. Nevertheless, the courts’ line of 
argument implied that had the risk not materialized, the 
plaintiffs would not have been entitled to any compensation for 
the infringement to their right to autonomy. If this analysis is 
correct, protection of the right to autonomy rested, in both 
cases, on the realization of risk and its associated physical 
injury.113 Hence, the legal protection given to the right of 
autonomy was limited to cases marked by these two 
characteristics: realization of the said risk and the existence of 
physical injury. 
                                                          
 109. See, e.g., Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 163; Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 
238. 
 110. These facts were stressed by all the judges in the majority in both 
cases as central to their decision to digress from traditional rules of 
causation. See Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 239–40, 260, 276–77; Chester, 
[2005] 1 A.C. at 146, 163, 165–66. 
 111. Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 242, 267. 
 112. Id.; Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 142. 
 113. Substantiation of this argument can be found, for example, in 
Justice Kirby’s reasoning in Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 271–72. 
KARAKO-EYAL N.  Has Non-U.S. Case Law Recognized a Legally Protected Autonomy 
Right?  MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 671-726. 
692 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.  [Vol. 10:2 
 
 
There is little doubt that linking the plaintiffs’ right to 
compensation to the realization of risk and the suffering of 
physical injury appeared natural in the circumstances of 
Chappel and Chester. Both plaintiffs had been harmed, and 
both claimed compensation on the basis of those injuries. A 
different but related question concerns whether the linking of 
the right to compensation to the realization of risk and the 
experience of physical injury, the result of which was only 
partial protection of the right to autonomy, is necessary and 
justified. As I will later argue, the response to this question 
should be in the negative. 
The approach taken by the courts in the two decisions—
that is, disregard of the fact that the real damage sustained by 
the plaintiffs was interference with their right to autonomy—
was expressed in connection with another issue. In both 
decisions, the judges accepted the contention that had the 
plaintiffs been fully informed about the procedure’s risk, they 
would have delayed the surgery.114 This position lies at the 
core of the conclusion that had the defendants fully informed 
them of the risks, the plaintiffs would presumably not have 
suffered any injury.115 At the same time, the judges agreed 
that if the evidence had indicated that the plaintiffs would not 
have postponed the time of the surgery but allowed it to be 
performed as agreed, it would be impossible to award them 
compensation.116 Although this conclusion may be justified 
with respect to the plaintiffs’ physical injuries, it cannot be 
accepted so far as it relates to the injury to their right to 
autonomy. 
I argue here that in the wake of the breach of the duty of 
disclosure, the plaintiffs’ right to autonomy was abridged, 
irrespective of whether they would have postponed the surgery 
or not. However, because the courts focused on the physical 
injury sustained by the plaintiffs rather than on the 
                                                          
 114. Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 254; Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 141. 
 115. Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 237; Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 141. 
 116. Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 237, 260, 273; Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 
141–42, 144, 154. Literature concurs with this position. See, e.g., 
JONATHAN HERRING, MEDICAL LAW AND ETHICS 105–06 (2006). This rule was 
also applied in a later decision in which the plaintiffs based their position 
on Chester. See SEM v. Mid Yorkshire Hosps., [2005] EWHC (QB), B3, 
[36], available at 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2005/B3.html. 
KARAKO-EYAL N.  Has Non-U.S. Case Law Recognized a Legally Protected Autonomy 
Right?  MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 671-726. 
2009] LEGALLY PROTECTED AUTONOMY RIGHT 693 
interference with their right to autonomy, the right to 
compensation became subject to a decision different from the 
one made by the patient, a condition that circumscribed the 
protection given to the right of autonomy. 
Another interesting question relates to why the courts 
chose to focus on the physical injury suffered, a choice that 
bound protection of the right to autonomy with evidence of 
physical injury as well as to the decision of causation. In other 
words: why were the courts unprepared to adopt the notion 
that the damage suffered by the plaintiffs for which they were 
due compensation was interference with their right to 
autonomy? 
The simplest response rests on the circumstances of the 
cases presented before the court, which I reiterate. As a result 
of medical treatment meant to improve their condition, the two 
plaintiffs suffered considerable physical injury.117 Yet, when it 
was ruled that their medical treatment had not been delivered 
negligently, it became impossible to award them compensation 
on theory of negligent treatment.118 At the same time, the 
plaintiffs were denied information on the risk inherent in the 
proposed surgery, a risk that came to fruition in these cases 
causing severe and permanent damage.119 Moreover, the 
plaintiff in Chappel had thoroughly investigated the risk to her 
voice were she to undergo the procedure and had expressed 
fears regarding the very injury she eventually suffered;120 the 
plaintiff in Chester had expressed a preference for avoiding the 
surgery altogether if the procedure was not essential.121 The 
courts certainly found it difficult to deny the plaintiffs’ claims; 
had they done so, it would have left the plaintiffs bereft of 
compensation for the injuries suffered. The desire to 
compensate the plaintiffs for their physical injuries, together 
with the defendants’ breach of duty of disclosure, led the 
courts to link together two separate objectives: compensation 
for the plaintiffs’ physical injury and protection of their right to 
autonomy. 
Yet analysis of the courts’ approach indicates a deeper 
explanation for their decision, one rooted in the doctrine of 
                                                          
 117. Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 253; Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 150. 
 118. Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 266. Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 142. 
 119. Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 237; Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 142. 
 120. Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 257. 
 121. Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 140. 
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informed consent and the characteristics of the cause of action 
presented by the plaintiffs, i.e., the tort of negligence. 
As already noted, the primary and immediate objective for 
elaboration of the doctrine of informed consent was expansion 
of physicians’ liability and guaranteeing that compensation 
would be awarded to a much greater number of patients 
harmed as a result of medical treatment, especially those who 
were unable to associate the cause of their injuries with 
negligent medical treatment.122 Indeed, from the outset, the 
doctrine of informed consent was presented as resting on the 
right to autonomy.123 The courts, however, continued to focus 
on compensation to the patients for their physical injuries. It 
should come as no surprise, then, that the courts continued in 
this vein in the Chappel and Chester cases. 
The award of compensation for the physical injuries 
suffered by the plaintiffs—as opposed to interference with the 
right to autonomy—is likewise closely related to the 
characteristics of the cause of action presented by the 
plaintiffs, the tort of negligence. The existence of some “injury” 
represents one cornerstone of the tort of negligence and an 
initial condition for assigning liability.124 Indeed, with time, 
this tort’s objectives were broadened beyond protection of the 
interest in physical well-being to the recognition of the injured 
party’s right to compensation for other injuries, such as pure 
economic injury and pure mental anguish;125 yet all of these 
injuries are considered tangible injuries. Furthermore, with 
respect to medical accidents, the tort of negligence has 
historically focused on the award of compensation to the 
patient for the physical, that is, tangible injury suffered.126 It 
could therefore be expected that a similar approach, stressing 
the physical injuries the plaintiffs suffered but disregarding the 
real harm done to their right to autonomy, should be adopted 
                                                          
 122. See Meisel, supra note 103, at 52, 56–60, 63–77; ENGLARD, supra 
note 103; Robertson, supra note 103. 
 123. See, e.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of 
Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 
P.2d 1, 9–10 (Cal. 1972); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 
1960). 
 124. See SIMON DEAKIN ET AL., MARKESINIS AND DEAKIN’S TORT LAW 113 
(6th ed. 2008). 
 125. Id. at 139–142, 157–99. 
 126. ENGLARD, supra note 103, at 163–64. 
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in the Chappel and Chester decisions. 
Several scholars, especially Shultz, have repeatedly argued 
that a major weakness of the tort of negligence in relation to 
the doctrine of informed consent is the presentation of proof of 
physical or some other tangible injury as a precondition for 
awarding compensation.127 Due to this focus, the true damage 
suffered by the patient, i.e., interference with her right to 
autonomy, has been ignored.128 
IV. WHAT SHOULD THE COURTS HAVE DONE IN 
CHAPPEL AND CHESTER? — A NEWLY IDENTIFIED HEAD 
OF DAMAGE 
As can be deduced from the previous critical analysis of 
the Chappel and the Chester rulings, I do not concur with the 
approach applied by the courts in either case. What, then, 
would I have recommended they do? I suggest that in the first 
stage, the court should have avoided awarding compensation 
for the physical injuries suffered. In the absence of causation, 
there was no reason to award compensation for such 
injuries.129 As to the second stage, I believe that the courts 
should have recognized the existence of a new head of 
                                                          
 127. See, e.g., Shultz, supra note 1, at 232–41; see also ENGLARD, supra 
note 103, at 164; EMILY JACKSON, MEDICAL LAW—TEXT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS 300, 302, 304 (2006); KATZ, supra note 30; Roger Crisp, 
Medical Negligence, Assault, Informed Consent, and Autonomy, 17 J.L. & 
SOC’Y 77, 80–81 (1990); Meisel, supra note 103, at 132–33; Peter H. 
Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 925, 936 (1994); 
Twerski & Cohen, supra note 30, at 616, 620. 
 128. See Shultz, supra note 1, at 251–53. 
 129. This argument should be distinguished so far as it relates to 
Chappel.  In that  case, if the plaintiff had been able to establish that had 
the defendant transmitted the information about the attendant risk of the 
surgery she would have been able to turn to a more skilled and 
experienced surgeon; that performance of the surgery by such a surgeon 
would have significantly reduced the related risk; and that realization of 
that risk resulted from the heightened risk to which she was exposed, the 
court could have ruled that the requirements of causation had been met, 
making it possible to award her compensation for the physical injury. 
However, as we have seen, only one of the three judges in the majority 
based his decision on this fact-based premise. For an argument in this 
spirit, see Kenyon Mason & Douglas Brodie, Bolam, Bolam—Wherefore Art 
Thou Bolam?, 9 EDINBURGH L. REV. 298, 305 (2005).  For a different 
approach, according to which the court was to compensate the plaintiff for 
the physical injury suffered despite the absence of causation, see Honoré, 
supra note 93. 
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damage—interference with the right to autonomy.130 
According to this new approach, when a patient’s right to 
autonomy suffers interference by a breach of the duty of 
disclosure or some other method (i.e., her ability to make 
decisions of her own free will is undermined), that patient 
suffers an injury for which she is entitled to compensation. 
This injury is experienced concurrent with the breach of the 
duty of disclosure, and its remedy is unrelated to the 
realization of the risk inherent in the respective procedure and 
the existence of physical injury.  Moreover, remedy for this 
injury is not subject to proof of a different decision that might 
have been made by the patient. Proof of a breach of the duty of 
disclosure necessarily entails proof of causation between the 
breach of that duty and the damage claimed by the patient, 
that is, interference with her right to autonomy. Of course, if 
the patient is able to prove that interference with her right to 
autonomy caused physical injury, she will be eligible for 
remedy for this injury as well. In any case, no remedy is to be 
awarded in the absence of proof of causation between the 
interference with her right to autonomy and the physical 
injury. 
A number of arguments support the correctness of 
recognizing this new tort, namely, the interference with the 
right to autonomy.  Because Shultz has provided some of the 
relevant considerations in her article, I present those 
arguments yet to be elaborated. 
A.  ADOPTION OF THIS NEW HEAD OF DAMAGE IS COMMENSURATE 
WITH THE PATIENT’S RIGHT TO AUTONOMY 
Acknowledgement of this right and, it follows, bona fide 
expression of its salience, requires its recognition as an 
independent and distinctive value warranting remedy. Such 
                                                          
 130. Support for this approach can be found in the literature.  See 
Mason & Brodie, supra note 129, at 305–06; Waddams, supra note 93, at 
7. For a similar approach according to which the courts were to rule in 
favor of providing remedy for the non-pecuniary damage suffered due to 
the breach of the duty of disclosure, see, e.g., Foster, supra note 93, at 
1645; Edward Levey, Taking the Scalpel to Compensation, L. SOC’Y 
GAZETTE, Dec. 2, 2004, at 37. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the approach 
I suggest is different, because it treats interference with the right to 
autonomy as a separate head of damage and not as a derivation of non-
pecuniary damages. 
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remedy is to be awarded in cases of interference with the right 
to autonomy (as opposed to injury to the interest of physical 
security) and should not be subject to the realization of any 
risk or proof of decision causation. The legal designation of 
interference with the right to autonomy as a separate 
compensable injury would convey indispensable normative 
confirmation of this approach, which carries an important 
message for patients as well as physicians.131 
It is interesting to note that in the Chester decision, Lord 
Hope, one of the judges in the majority, noted that recognition 
of the duty to compensate a patient whose right to autonomy 
was infringed has a powerful symbolic and galvanizing role in 
the creation of a more substantive right to autonomy for 
patients.132 However, the normative statement that eventually 
emerged under the court’s aegis did not transmit the promised 
symbolic message. 
B. THIS RULE’S ADOPTION WILL INTRODUCE COHERENCE 
Award of compensation to a patient for a physical injury 
suffered in the absence of causation, together with 
conditioning that compensation on the realization of a risk as 
well as the establishment of decision causation, introduces 
vertical as well as horizontal incoherence.133 That is, vertical 
incoherence is created between the legal rules—the duty to ask 
for the patient’s consent as well as the duty of disclosure—and 
the theoretical basis of those rules, specifically, the patient’s 
right to autonomy. Furthermore, internal (horizontal) 
incoherence is introduced among the legal rules themselves by 
                                                          
 131. Twerski & Cohen, supra note 30, at 665; Emily Jackson, ‘Informed 
Consent’ to Medical Treatment and the Impotence of Tort, in FIRST DO NO 
HARM: LAW, ETHICS AND HEALTHCARE 273, 284 (Shelia A.M. McLean ed., 
2006); Levit, supra note 30, at 174, 188–90. 
 132. Chester v. Afshar, [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 A.C. 134, 162–63 
(U.K.). 
 133. According to coherence theories of law, the question of whether 
the legal rule is coherent with former legal rules or legal principles is 
relevant when dealing with the issue of validity or “correctness” of legal 
rules or decisions. Furthermore, coherence considerations should be part 
of legal reasoning because this is the best way to identify the correct legal 
solution. There are different classifications of theories of coherence; one of 
which differentiates between vertical coherence and horizontal coherence. 
For a discussion on the nature of vertical coherence see, e.g., NEIL 
MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 106–07, 152 (1978); as 
to horizontal coherence, see, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 41–
42, 65–66 (rev. ed. 1969). 
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inappropriately distinguishing between different defendants. 
If the patient’s right to autonomy rests at the foundations 
of a legal settlement, any interference with that right should 
entitle the patient to compensation even if the risk inherent in 
the respective treatment was not realized and the patient 
suffered no physical injury. Moreover, compensation is due 
even if the patient’s decision would not have been different had 
there been no breach of the duty of disclosure.  Interference 
with the patient’s right to autonomy materializes with the 
breach of the duty of disclosure, independent of any physical 
injury or establishment of any other course of action.  In 
addition, if the patient’s right to autonomy rests at the 
foundation of physicians’ basic duties to their patients, then 
breach of those duties should entitle patients to compensation 
for the interference itself rather than for the physical injury 
caused by the medical treatment but not by the interference 
with the right to autonomy. 
Moreover, stipulating patient rights to compensation on 
the realization of risk or proof of an alternative decision 
introduces a distinction between plaintiffs who suffered a 
physical injury and can prove the possibility of an alternative 
decision, which entitles them to compensation, and plaintiffs 
who did not suffer a physical injury or are unable to prove the 
possibility of an alternate decision, and who are thus not 
entitled to compensation. Such prejudice is inappropriate 
when recognizing the fact that both experienced interference 
with their right to autonomy and that the latter may have 
suffered damage to her right, which is equal to if not more 
severe than the damage suffered by the former.134 
Recognition of the interference with the patient’s right to 
autonomy as a distinct compensable injury, bounded neither 
by the realization of risk nor evidence of decision causation, 
mitigates incoherence by expressing the notion that the 
patient’s right to compensation becomes palpable upon the 
breach of any of the physician’s duties, and that the true 
injury suffered by the patient in such cases is the interference 
with her right to autonomy.135 
                                                          
 134. Regarding the vertical incoherence created by the rule adopted in 
the Chester decision, see JACKSON & POWELL ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY 
1013 (John L. Powell et al. eds., 6th ed. 2007). 
 135. ENGLARD, supra note 103, at 166; Roger B. Dworkin, Getting What 
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It is interesting to note that the issue of horizontal 
coherence was mentioned by Lord Hope, one of the judges in 
the Chester case. The judge stated that the duty of disclosure 
imposed on the defendant, resting as it does on the patient’s 
right to autonomy, is unaffected by any decision the plaintiff 
might have made had she received all the information about 
the inherent risk.136 Considerations of vertical coherence can 
also be found in the remainder of his opinion.  According to 
Justice Lord Hope, denial of compensation to patients who are 
unable to candidly state that they would have definitely 
refused the medical treatment and can only prove they would 
have deferred the treatment in order to consult with other 
professionals, represents discrimination.137 The duty to 
transmit information about all the risks inherent in a 
procedure to a patient who finds it difficult to make a decision 
and would prefer to postpone treatment is identical to the duty 
toward a patient capable of proving that she would refuse the 
treatment at any time.138 Yet, despite the weight given to 
considerations of coherence, the decision reflected a lack of 
horizontal as well as vertical coherence. 
C. ADOPTION OF THIS NEW RULE IS CONSISTENT WITH 
CONSIDERATIONS OF DETERRENCE 
Award of compensation to patients for physical injuries 
suffered, despite the absence of causation between the 
interference with their right to autonomy and the said injuries, 
indicates application of a rule according to which physicians 
are liable for all the harm suffered by patients in the wake of 
medical treatment, including those injuries for which they are 
not guilty. Alternatively, restricting a patient’s right to 
compensation to those cases where they can establish physical 
injury as a result of the physician’s breach of some duty 
toward his patients indicates adoption of a rule relieving 
physicians of liability in two situations: first, where the patient 
did not suffer any physical injury as a result of the treatment; 
                                                          
We Should from Doctors: Rethinking Patient Autonomy and the Doctor-
Patient Relationship, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 235, 247 (2003); Joan H. Krause, 
Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost 
Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 364–65 (1999); Twerski & Cohen, 
supra note 30, at 608, 616. 
 136. Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 154. 
 137. Id. at 162. 
 138. Id. 
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second, where the patient suffered personal injury but was 
unable to establish decision causation. 
These rules do not accord with the aspiration to achieve 
efficient deterrence. In order to do so, the economic burden 
caused by harmful activity, which is to precisely equal the 
social costs incurred due to that harmful activity, must be 
internalized by the appropriate party.139 Put simply, a rule that 
imposes social costs on a damager even if the respective costs 
were not caused by his harmful activity is likely to initiate 
over-deterrence.140 Alternatively, a rule that frees a damager of 
liability in cases where his harmful activity incurred some 
social cost can be expected to precipitate under-deterrence.141 
It follows that a rule that allows imposition of liability on 
physicians for the physical injuries suffered by their patients 
as a result of medical treatment even in the absence of 
causation between the interference with the right to autonomy 
and those injuries, is expected to induce over-deterrence. And 
the contrary: a rule that relieves doctors of liability in cases 
where they breached one of their duties and thus interfered 
with their patients right to autonomy, based on the grounds 
that the patient did not suffer personal injury or is unable to 
prove the “decision causation” can be expected to induce 
under-deterrence.142 
Recognition of interference with the right of autonomy as a 
compensable injury is expected to prevent award of 
compensation to patients, despite the absence of causation,143 
at the same time that it will avoid conditioning entitlement to 
compensation on the existence of physical injury or proof of 
                                                          
 139. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 383–
84 (5th ed. 2008). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Damage to the doctrine’s effectiveness regarding deterrence is 
expected to arise especially in cases where it is difficult to distinguish 
between outcomes originating in medical treatment and outcomes 
originating in the natural development of a disease, where the patient’s 
medical condition requires treatment, and where the risk inherent in 
alternative procedures is identical. 
 143. This argument is based on the assumption that if we recognize the 
interference with the right to autonomy as a new head of damage, there 
will no longer be any need to impose liability on the perpetrator of the 
physical injury suffered by the patient despite the absence of causation in 
order to assign normative relevance to the patient’s right to autonomy. 
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decision causation. In other words, recognition of this new 
head of damage increases the probability that the damager will 
be obliged to pay the social costs of his harmful activity. It 
follows that this approach is congruent with the interests of 
deterrence. 
It is interesting to note that in the Chester case, the court 
thought it worthwhile to assign practical meaning and 
relevance to the duties imposed on physicians as well as to the 
patient’s right to autonomy. It was clear to them that 
protecting such interests requires imposition of liability on the 
defendant for the respective injuries.144 Although we may 
initially interpret their statements as expressions of the court’s 
aspiration to achieve deterrence, we soon realize that an 
inefficient rule was nonetheless adopted. 
D. ADOPTION OF THIS RULE COMPLIES WITH THE INTERESTS OF 
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE145 
One of the elements characterizing tort law in general and 
corrective justice in particular is correlativity. Correlativity is 
expressed, among other things, in the fact that the defendant’s 
harmful actions caused injury to the plaintiff on the one hand, 
and in the imposition of liability on the defendant to correct 
the damage through the award of compensation 
commensurate with the injury on the other hand.146 
Considerations of corrective justice therefore demand that 
if the equality between the parties—patient and physician—
was abrogated as a result of the physician’s harmful action, 
the physician will be liable for the patient’s injury, expressed 
as the interference with her right to autonomy. Adoption of a 
rule imposing liability on the physician for the physical injuries 
resulting from medical treatment but not from interference 
with the patient’s right to autonomy or, alternatively, adoption 
of a rule releasing the physician of liability for the injuries for 
which he is culpable (interference with the patient’s right to 
autonomy), contradicts the outcomes required by corrective 
justice. 
                                                          
 144. Chester v. Afshar, [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 A.C. 134, 146, 150–
59, 162–63, 166 (U.K.). 
 145. For support of this argument, see Levit, supra note 30, at 189–90. 
 146. Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 15, 26–27 (1995); Ernest J. Weinrib, Correlativity, Personality, and 
the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN 
L. 107, 110, 116 (2001). 
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As we have seen, considerations of justice, especially of 
corrective justice, were major factors in the two decisions cited.  
It was unthinkable to the courts that the defendants’ breach of 
the duty of disclosure and interference with the plaintiffs’ right 
to autonomy should have no legal response. Yet, despite the 
correctness of these views, the decisions’ outcomes fully 
contradicted the stated intentions. The interference with the 
plaintiffs’ right to autonomy indeed justified a legal response 
as expressed in the defendants’ liability but, contrary to the 
rulings in the cases, not for the physical injuries suffered by 
the plaintiffs as they were not in fact caused by the breach of 
the duty of disclosure. A more appropriate application of the 
principles of corrective justice would have required making the 
defendants liable for the injury caused to the plaintiffs’ right to 
autonomy. 
E. RECOGNITION OF INTERFERENCE WITH THE RIGHT TO 
AUTONOMY AS A COMPENSABLE DAMAGE COMPLIES WITH THE 
LAW’S EVOLUTION 
One of the central arguments upon which Shultz based 
her thesis was the fact that provision of protection to the right 
to autonomy, and thus the interest in choice, represents a 
natural extension of developments in constitutional and civil 
law.147 There is no need to repeat this argument, which was 
extensively elaborated in her article. I would nevertheless like 
to add to this reasoning. 
Protection from interference with personal autonomy and 
dignity underlines recent recognition of remedy for the misuse 
of private information in the form of a new tort, that of 
invasion of privacy in New Zealand,148 and as a further stage 
in the development of breach of confidence in England.149 
These recent developments reinforce the contention that 
recognition of the right to autonomy as a separate interest, the 
interference with which entitles the patient to compensation, is 
to be found in common law. Moreover, if the law is prepared to 
protect the right to autonomy with respect to the misuse of 
private information, it is right and proper that the same 
                                                          
 147. Shultz, supra note 1, at 276–81. 
 148. See Hosking v. Runting, [2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 1, 8 (C.A.). 
 149. Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457, 464–
66 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). 
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protection should be extended to instances where it is most 
needed: cases of interference with the right of a person to 
make an informed decision regarding the medical treatment 
that she is to receive. 
 Despite the presence of these weighty reasons 
supporting creation of the proposed new head of damage, one 
cannot ignore two of the arguments raised against the 
introduction of such a rule: the fear of over-deterrence and the 
fear of incurring excessive administrative costs. Each will be 
discussed separately. 
1. The Fear of Over-deterrence 
According to this argument, the legal rule recognizing 
interference with the right to autonomy as a compensable 
damage could motivate physicians to practice defensive 
medicine. In other words, in the absence of the duty to 
establish physical injury or decision causation, the scope of 
medical liability is likely to expand, meaning that this legal 
rule may instigate over-deterrence. 
 In-depth review of this argument leads, I believe, to the 
conclusion that it is inadequate as justification for a rule that 
would waive a physician’s liability for this damage. 
 First of all, the Chappel and Chester decisions indicate 
that, surprisingly, we can expect adoption of this new head of 
damage to prevent over-deterrence. As we have seen, the 
courts in both cases awarded compensation to the plaintiffs for 
their physical injuries, despite the absence of traditional 
causation, because they felt that the interference with the right 
to autonomy deserved a legal response.150 These decisions, 
which allowed the imposition on the defendants of the social 
costs (i.e., the patients’ physical injuries) not caused by the 
defendants’ harmful activities (i.e., the breach of duty of 
disclosure) can be expected to instigate over-deterrence.  
Recognition of the new damage (i.e., interference with the right 
to autonomy) will prevent such situations. The courts will now 
be able to give direct normative expression of the importance of 
the right to autonomy by awarding compensation to patients 
for interference with that right without recourse to a substitute 
in the guise of compensation for physical injury. Such a step 
                                                          
 150. See Chappel v. Hart (1998) 195 C.L.R. 232, 239, available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1998/55.html; Chester v. 
Afshar, [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 A.C. 134, 146 (U.K.). 
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will enable imposition of the true social costs of harmful 
practices on the defendants and consequently facilitate 
efficient deterrence. 
 Second, we should remember that not all additional 
investments in precautionary measures by the damager 
represent over-deterrence.  Only those investments in means of 
deterrence entailing costs beyond the expected loss represent 
over-deterrence. Hence, the additional investments in 
precautionary measures,151 to be anticipated in the wake of 
recognition of the new head of damage, might not necessarily 
reflect over-deterrence.  On the contrary, considering the fact 
that a rule that releases physicians of their liability for 
interference with the patient’s rights to autonomy (due to the 
absence of injury or decision causation) induces under-
deterrence, the assignment of liability for that interference will 
result in internalization of the social costs incurred by 
physicians’ actions, a step likely to conclude in efficient 
deterrence. 
 Third, even though creation of the new head of damage 
is expected to enhance physicians’ liability and extend that 
liability to cases where patients did not suffer any physical 
injury or could not establish decision causation, the new rule 
is not expected to magnify those duties flowing from the 
doctrine of informed consent. Patients requesting 
compensation for interference with their right to autonomy will 
still be forced to establish a breach of duty. It follows that the 
rule’s effect on the scope of medical liability will thus be more 
limited than anticipated. Consequently, as far as the 
phenomenon of over-deterrence is linked to the scope of 
liability that physicians themselves take into account, we can 
conclude that recognition of this new head of damage as 
compensable cannot be expected to dramatically intensify the 
danger of over-deterrence. 
2. The Fear of High Administrative Costs 
This argument states that a legal rule recognizing 
                                                          
 151. In the field of informed consent, additional investment in 
precautionary measures will be expressed in additional time devoted to 
disclosing information to patients, additional staff (i.e., social service 
workers) interacting with patients, longer consent forms and additional 
documentation of informed consent. 
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interference with the right to autonomy as a compensable 
damage will add to the population of injured parties claiming a 
cause of action; the subsequent growth in the number of 
petitions presented will overwhelm the courts and escalate the 
accompanying administrative costs.  But here, as well, detailed 
examination of the argument leads to the conclusion that it is 
insufficient to justify adoption of a contrary rule that releases 
physicians of their liability for interference with this right. 
 First, in a large proportion of cases, the new rule will not 
provide the plaintiff with a cause of action previously 
unavailable. This will be the case in situations like the ones 
dealt with in Chappel and Chester. The two decisions have 
already expanded the population of plaintiffs by recognizing 
entitlement to compensation even in cases where heavy doubt 
remained regarding causation. Recognition of the new head of 
damage, then, is not expected to further enlarge the number of 
plaintiffs belonging to this category; rather, it will simply 
enable more accurate depiction of the respective injury. 
Second, victims’ presentation of claims represents an 
essential feature of the tort’s internalization mechanism and 
hence a precondition to the achievement of efficient 
deterrence.152 The presentation of more claims, even if it 
induces higher administrative costs, might then indicate the 
need for just such an internalization mechanism and, it 
follows, a necessary condition for achieving economic 
efficiency.153 Here we should also mention that the contrary 
rule releasing physicians of liability for interference with their 
patient’s right to autonomy when physical injury or decision 
causation are absent is expected to deter patients unable to 
prove physical injury under such conditions from presenting 
their claims. Even though the result is likely to be a reduction 
in administrative costs, this contrary rule, because it inevitably 
undermines the effect of deterrence embodied in the doctrine of 
                                                          
 152. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 192 (7th ed. 2007). 
 153. It is appropriate to recall here the approach taken by Calabresi, 
stating that the desirable objective of tort law is the eventual reduction of 
the total costs of accidents, not the prevention of specific types of costs.  
Hence, if efficient deterrence can be achieved only by means of additional 
administrative costs, and if such an act can be expected to reduce total 
accidental costs, additional administrative costs do not represent a 
negative but, rather, a necessarily positive phenomenon, one that is 
commensurate with the interests of economic efficiency.  See GUIDO 
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 29–
30 (1970). 
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informed consent, reduces economic efficiency.  It follows that 
the very recognition of this damage (i.e., interference with the 
right to autonomy) as compensable may induce higher 
administrative costs; however, it will, at the same time, 
improve deterrence and thus reduce the number of cases of 
interference with this right. In other words, the expected 
administrative costs may be worthwhile and a more efficient 
outcome from the perspective of accident costs may be 
expected. 
Third, as the literature shows, the rate of claims submitted 
by patients suffering from medical negligence is low.154 This 
finding, when added to the fact that the compensation awarded 
for interference with the right to autonomy can be expected to 
be lower than that awarded for physical injury, indicates that 
the anxiety over inundation with claims and increasing 
administrative costs may be unrealistic.155 
Fourth, incentives favoring the presentation of claims can 
be expected to be influenced not only by the proposed new 
legal rule, but also by other legal rules associated with the 
doctrine of informed consent. Thus, after adoption of the new 
rule, patients requesting compensation will still face the 
burden of providing proof of the said breach of duty. This task 
is far from simple due to evidential difficulties as well as the 
stipulations of the legal rules defining the physician’s duties. It 
appears, then, that recognition of interference with the right of 
autonomy as a compensable damage will not significantly 
improve a plaintiff’s prospects for successful adjudication of 
her claim. Hence, we can expect that the incentives 
encouraging plaintiffs to present negligence claims against 
physicians will continue to be limited by the informed consent 
doctrine’s other rules. 
Fifth, the previously mentioned incentives to present 
                                                          
 154. See Edward A. Dauer, When the Law Gets in the Way: The 
Dissonant Link of Deterrence and Compensation in the Law of Medical 
Practice, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 293, 297 (2000) (citing HARVARD MEDICAL 
PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, 
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK 11-4 
(1990)); Geoffrey C. Rapp,  Doctors, Duties, Death and Data: A Critical 
Review of the Empirical Literature on Medical Malpractice and Tort Reform, 
26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 439, 449 (2006). 
 155. For support of this argument, see COOTER & ULEN, supra note 
139, at 379–80. 
KARAKO-EYAL N.  Has Non-U.S. Case Law Recognized a Legally Protected Autonomy 
Right?  MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 671-726. 
2009] LEGALLY PROTECTED AUTONOMY RIGHT 707 
claims, and thus inflate administrative costs, can be 
influenced with the appropriate rules. For instance, limiting 
the amounts to be awarded for interference with the right to 
autonomy is expected to dissuade patients whose sense of 
injury to their right to autonomy is not sufficiently strong from 
presenting their claims given the time and effort demanded for 
managing legal proceedings. 
The conclusion demanded from this discussion is, 
therefore, that recognition of the new head of damage of 
interference with the patient’s autonomy is the correct step to 
take. Israel’s Supreme Court took that position in the 
innovative Ali Daaka decision.156 
                                                          
 156. CA 2781/93 Ali Daaka v. Carmel Hosp., Haifa [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 
526. A comprehensive survey of decisions and the literature on English, 
Australian, Canadian and American law indicates that in cases where the 
claimed cause of action was absence of informed consent, the court did 
not recognize interference with the right to autonomy as a compensable 
tort.  The courts ruled that the victim was entitled to compensation only if 
she could establish that she had suffered physical injury as a result of a 
breach of the declared duty. See JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED 
CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 138–142 (2d ed. 2001); 
HERRING, supra note 116, at 104; JACKSON, supra note 127, at 290; 
Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Law of Informed Consent: From “Doctor is Right” to 
“Patient Has Rights,” 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243, 1245 (2000); Laurel R. 
Hanson, Note, Informed Consent and the Scope of a Physician’s Duty of 
Disclosure, 77 N. DAK. L. REV. 71, 76 (2001). Indeed, as we shall see, the 
English House of Lords recognized interference with the right to autonomy 
as a compensable damage in the Rees decision; however, the specific 
incident dealt with a case of negligent sterilization and not a breach of 
informed consent. Rees v. Darlington Mem’l Hosp. NHS Trust, [2003] 
UKHL 52, [2004] 1 A.C. 309, 313, 349 (U.K), available at 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2003/52.html. Therefore, the 
Israeli Supreme Court is a pioneer in this respect. It is also important to 
note that several decisions have adopted the approach that a patient is 
entitled to compensation for the mental anguish suffered as a result of the 
breach of the duty of informed consent even if she is unable to prove 
physical injury as a result of the breach.  However, the compensation was 
awarded for tangible mental anguish (e.g., anxiety regarding future 
personal injury or trauma as a result of disclosure), not for interference 
with the patient’s right to autonomy.  See, e.g., Doe v. Noe, 690 N.E.2d 
1012, 1020–21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Jones v. Howard Univ., Inc., 589 A.2d 
419, 422–25  (D.C. 1991); Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 337, 339 (Md. 
1993); K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 559–62 (Minn. 1995); Snider v. 
Henniger, [1992] 96 D.L.R. (4th) 367, 374–75 (Can.); Lachambre v. Nair, 
[1989] 2 W.W.R. 749, 763 (Can.); Smith v. Barking, Havering and 
Brentwood Health Authority, (1994) 5 Med. L.R. 285, 288, 291–292; Note, 
Goorkani v. Tayside Health Board, 1991 S.L.T. 94, 95–96.  Obviously, the 
patient who bases her cause of action on the tort of assault can obtain 
compensation even if she is unable to prove that she suffered physical 
injury as a result of the interference with her right to autonomy. See 
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V. THE ALI DAAKA DECISION 
In this case, the patient, although hospitalized in order to 
undergo surgery on her left leg, underwent surgery on her 
right shoulder for the purpose of performing a biopsy given 
fears of a malignancy. The decision to operate on her shoulder 
was made by the attending physicians proximate to the 
surgery. Hence, although the plaintiff had signed a consent 
form regarding the surgery on her leg on the day of her 
hospitalization, she was informed of the need to undergo a 
procedure on her shoulder only on the day of the operation. 
Her signature on the consent form regarding the latter 
procedure was obtained while she was lying on the operating 
table, under the influence of anesthetizing drugs, without 
being informed about the risks inherent in the procedure. As a 
result of the surgery the plaintiff suffered damage to her 
shoulder. She filed a claim based on the tort of negligence 
while arguing that she had not transmitted any valid consent 
to the procedure. 
The court ruled that acquisition of the plaintiff’s consent 
under such circumstances, that is, without informing her of 
the attendant risks, represented negligence on the part of the 
defendants.157 Nevertheless, the judges in the majority were 
convinced that the plaintiff had not proven causation between 
the negligence and the consequent injury. It accordingly ruled 
that the plaintiff was not entitled to compensation for the 
physical injury suffered following the surgery on her 
shoulder.158 After this decision was handed down, the court 
addressed the question of whether it was possible to award the 
plaintiff compensation for the non-pecuniary damage caused 
as a result of the defendants’ interference with her right to 
autonomy. Following detailed, intensive discussion, the judges 
                                                          
Meisel, supra note 103, at 74–75. However, a patient can claim the tort of 
assault only if she can substantiate that she did not consent to the 
treatment or that no information was transmitted regarding the nature of 
the treatment. See MICHAEL A. JONES, MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE 522 (3d ed. 
2003); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782–83 (D.C. Cir. 1972); 
Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 114 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 10–11 (Can.); Rogers v. 
Whitaker, [1992] 175 C.L.R. 479, 490 (Can.). Moreover, in the absence of 
tangible injury, the patient will be awarded nominal damages rather than 
compensatory damages. See HARVEY MCGREGOR, MCGREGOR ON DAMAGES 
360 (17th ed. 2003). 
 157. Ali Daaka, [1999] IsrSC 53(4) at 550, 563, 587. 
 158. Id. at 564–70. 
KARAKO-EYAL N.  Has Non-U.S. Case Law Recognized a Legally Protected Autonomy 
Right?  MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 671-726. 
2009] LEGALLY PROTECTED AUTONOMY RIGHT 709 
in the majority responded positively,159 basing their 
conclusions on three considerations. 
A. INTERFERENCE WITH A PATIENT’S RIGHT TO AUTONOMY CAN BE 
DEFINED AS A “DAMAGE” ACCORDING TO THE TORT ACT 
This statement demands clarification. In Israeli law, the 
tort of negligence is elaborated in the Civil Wrongs 
Ordinance.160 In Israeli law, the foundations of this tort are 
identical to those in Anglo-American law, and require existence 
of some damage.161 Accordingly, in order for the plaintiff to 
claim the tort of negligence, she must prove that the injury 
represents “damage” as defined in the Civil Wrongs Ordinance, 
paragraph two, that is: “loss of life, or loss of, or detriment to, 
any property, comfort, bodily welfare, reputation or other 
similar loss or detriment.”162 The court in Ali Daaka ruled that 
injury to one’s feelings as a result of interference with her 
basic right to autonomy constitutes an injury to her well-being 
and thus represents “damage” as defined in the Ordinance.163 
B. RECOGNITION OF INTERFERENCE WITH THE RIGHT TO 
AUTONOMY AS A COMPENSABLE DAMAGE IS COMPATIBLE WITH 
LEGAL POLICY 
Influenced by its awareness that a person’s right to 
autonomy is an elemental component of the Israeli legal 
system as well as the fact that exercise of this right has special 
significance in the context of medical treatment, the court 
ruled that not only should physicians anticipate the damage 
associated with that right’s interference as a factual issue, they 
should also anticipate it as a matter of legal policy. The court 
mentioned four fundamental considerations to support its 
conclusion. First, the existence of trust and close ties between 
patient and doctor, in addition to the patient being in the first 
circle of risk, indicates proximity between those providing 
treatment and the patient.164 Second, given that the physician 
enjoys an absolute advantage over the patient with respect to 
the pertinent knowledge, and given his ability to take the 
                                                          
 159. Id. at 581, 616. 
 160. Civil Wrongs Ordinance (New Version), 1972, 2 LSI(NV) 5 (Isr.). 
 161. Id. at 6. 
 162. Civil Wrongs Ordinance (New Version), 1972, 2 LSI(NV) at 5. 
 163. Ali Daaka, [1999] IsrSC 53(4) at 574–75. 
 164. Id. at 576. 
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measures necessary to prevent interference with the patient’s 
right to autonomy, it appears that the physician is in a 
superior position to prevent the respective damage. 
Recognition of this injury as compensable is therefore likely to 
contribute to the prevention of the stated damage and thus is 
justified.165 Third, provision of treatment without the patient’s 
informed consent represents a breach of the physician’s 
contractual duty to act in a skilled and reasonable manner 
when providing treatment. 
The patient is therefore entitled to enjoy the right to 
compensation for the non-pecuniary damage caused by that 
breach, which is similar in nature to the damage caused by 
interference with a patient’s right to autonomy. The aspiration 
not to inappropriately distinguish between contractual claims 
and tort claims thus justifies recognition of the respective 
injury as compensable within the framework of tort law.166  
Finally, acceptance of the argument that the patient has a 
right to select the medical treatment most suitable for her 
requires determination of a “price” to be attached to the injury 
to her dignity, expressed in the performance of medical 
procedures without first obtaining her informed consent.167 
C. THE STANDARD ARGUMENTS RAISED AGAINST RECOGNITION OF 
THIS NEW HEAD OF DAMAGE—SUCH AS THE ANXIETY REGARDING 
“MEDICAL DEFENSIVENESS,” THE FEAR OF HIGH ADMINISTRATIVE 
COSTS AND THE ABSENCE OF AN INJURY APPROPRIATE FOR 
COMPENSATION—DO NOT JUSTIFY NEGATION OF THE INJURED 
PARTY’S RIGHT TO COMPENSATION FOR INTERFERENCE WITH HER 
RIGHT TO AUTONOMY168 
Further to its conclusion that interference with the right to 
autonomy represents a compensable damage, the court in this 
case expressed its opinion that this category of compensation 
is not to be treated as a proxy for compensation for the 
physical injury suffered due to the said interference. The 
damage to the patient’s right to autonomy, it reiterated, is 
separate and distinct from the damage of physical injury, 
compensation for which is supplemental to the compensation 
                                                          
 165. Id. at 576–77. 
 166. Id. at 580. 
 167. Id. at 581. 
 168. See id. at 577–79. 
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awarded for the patient’s physical injury.169 
These considerations led the court to conclude that the 
plaintiff was entitled to compensation for the non-pecuniary 
outcomes of the interference with her right to autonomy. After 
evaluating the damage incurred, it awarded her compensation 
of NIS 15,000.170 
VI. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ALI DAAKA DECISION 
AND THE PROPOSED NEW APPROACH 
There is no doubt that the Ali Daaka ruling quite 
considerably meets the requirements of Shultz’s vision, 
although careful review of the decision indicates that some 
gaps remain. This conclusion flows from an analysis of the 
principles determined with respect to how compensation for 
the new damage of interference with the right to autonomy is 
to be assessed. 
The crux of the approach adopted by the court is that the 
compensation is to be assessed according to the non-
pecuniary-subjective-tangible outcomes of the interference 
with the patient’s right to autonomy. That is, according to the 
degree to which her feelings and sensitivities were wounded171 
(hereinafter, the subjective approach). 
In assessing compensation for the wounding of the 
patient’s feelings and sensitivities as a result of interference 
with her right to autonomy, the following factors must be 
considered. How severe is the breach of informed consent?172 
For example, the more meaningful the information not 
transmitted to the patient, the greater the severity of the 
interference with her right to autonomy, hence, the larger is 
the compensation to be awarded.173 How important is the 
decision to the patient? As the decision’s importance grows, so 
does the interference with her participation in decision making 
                                                          
 169. Id. at 581–82, 618. 
 170. An amount valued at about $4,500. (This amount was calculated 
based on the current exchange rate, which is about NIS 4.2 to $1)  The Ali 
Daaka ruling has been implemented by Israeli courts in numerous 
decisions since it was handed down. Review of the decisions indicates that 
in the majority of cases, the amount of the compensation ranged between 
NIS 15,000 and NIS 50,000, that is, between about $4,500 and about 
$15,000. 
 171. Ali Daaka, [1999] IsrSC 53(4) at 583–84, 618–19, 621, 623. 
 172. Id. at 583, 620. 
 173. Id. at 583. 
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and, consequently, so does the damage to her right to 
autonomy. The likelihood that she will be entitled to greater 
compensation increases in tandem.174 
What is the effect of the interference on the patient’s 
decision? If the information not transmitted might have 
changed her attitude regarding the medical treatment, we can 
assume that the damage was greater and that she will be 
entitled to more compensation.175 What is the patient’s 
attitude toward transmission of medical information?  That is, 
if the patient delegated decision-making to the physician and 
requested no details about her medical condition, we can 
assume that she suffered no harm from the interference.176  
What were the results of the treatment? For instance, the fact 
that the treatment succeeded even though it was performed 
without the patient’s informed consent is likely to reduce the 
compensation considerably.177 
The foregoing list is only partial.178 The court also added 
general guidelines, advocating that the courts adopt a 
balanced attitude.  On the one hand, the court was requested 
to recall that the cause of action entailed damage to a basic 
right and thus demanded determination of appropriate as 
opposed to symbolic compensation. On the other hand, the 
court was to restrain itself and avoid the award of exaggerated 
compensation.179 
Finally, it is interesting to note that even though the court 
adopted the approach entailing assessment of compensation 
according to the non-pecuniary-subjective-tangible outcomes 
of the interference with the patient’s right to autonomy, it also 
deemed it appropriate to disengage that compensation from 
dependence on the patient’s submission of detailed evidence 
regarding the extent of damage suffered. In such cases of 
general injury, the court was likely to award, under the 
appropriate circumstances, some pecuniary compensation 
even in the absence of detailed proof of tangible harm. The 
underlying reasoning for this statement is that the existence 
                                                          
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 620. 
 176. Id. at 620–21. 
 177. Id. at 621. 
 178. Id. at 583. 
 179. Id. 
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and severity of the injury was due to the very interference with 
the patient’s right to autonomy; hence, the court is able to 
assess compensation after considering all the known factors of 
the case.180 
Several conclusions can be deduced from the principles 
adopted by the court. First, to award compensation, there 
must be proof of subjective and tangible outcomes—such as 
wounded feelings—subsequent to the interference with the 
patient’s right to autonomy. Closely related is denial of the 
victim’s right to compensation from the damagers if, for one 
reason or another, the victim is unaware of this interference 
and is therefore unable to feel the emotional consequences of 
the injury.  Included in this category are persons who died 
during medical treatment, or immediately afterwards, without 
learning that they had suffered interference with their right to 
autonomy; persons who remained unconscious following 
treatment and are not expected to regain consciousness and 
who are therefore unaware of the interference or exhibit no 
emotional responses such as sorrow or mental anguish in its 
wake; and persons who, as a result of medical treatment, have 
suffered cognitive loss and are unaware of their surroundings. 
Patients of this type are not entitled to compensation for the 
interference with their right to autonomy even though the 
interference with their right is likely to be equal or perhaps 
greater in severity than that suffered by patients who are able 
to feel its outcomes. 
Second, application of this approach is expected to 
conclude in award of considerably low compensation, 
particularly in two types of cases: cases in which the medical 
treatment succeeded and did not cause the patient any 
physical injury;181 and cases where decision causation cannot 
be proved.182 We are able to assume in these two instances, 
given the absence of other evidence, that the patient’s feelings 
were only mildly wounded, either because the treatment 
succeeded and the patient suffered no physical injury, or 
because the patient would not have made a different decision 
even in the absence of any interference with her right to 
autonomy. 
It follows that the approach adopted by the court is likely 
                                                          
 180. Id. at 583. 
 181. Id. at 621. 
 182. Id. at 620. 
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to culminate in the award of low compensation in exactly those 
cases where the new head of damage is most pertinent, that is, 
cases where the plaintiffs cannot prove physical injury or 
decision causation. This, indeed, describes the circumstances 
in the Ali Daaka case, where the court ruled that decision 
causation had not been substantiated. The compensation 
awarded to the plaintiff was a mere NIS 15,000 despite the fact 
that her right to autonomy had been most grossly interfered 
with. 
The court failed to fully grant sufficient weight to the 
patient’s right to autonomy. It is difficult to deny that the 
amount of compensation awarded to the plaintiff reflects the 
importance society attaches to the interest damaged.183 Denial 
of the right to compensation for interference with a patient’s 
right to autonomy or the award of meager compensation for 
that interference, despite the extreme interference suffered, 
does not accord with the idea that the right to autonomy is an 
interest to be protected. 
Nor does the ruling in the Ali Daaka case accord with 
considerations of deterrence or corrective justice. These 
require, as we have seen, a stipulation declaring that the 
perpetrator is to be charged for the damage he caused.  
Whoever interferes with a patient’s right to autonomy is to 
carry the social cost of the harm, whether or not the patient is 
aware of the outcomes of the interference, whether or not she 
suffered physical injury, and whether or not she can or cannot 
prove decision causation. 
Finally, the subjective approach does not abide by 
standards of coherence. Not only does it not comply with the 
patient’s right to autonomy and thus creates horizontal 
incoherence, it also introduces an inappropriate distinction 
between victims based on the level of their awareness 
regarding the interference with their right to autonomy in 
addition to their ability to provide evidence of tangible injury as 
well as decision causation.184 By following that path, the 
                                                          
 183. Donna Benedek, Non-Pecuniary Damages: Defined, Assessed and 
Capped, 32 REVUE JURIDQUE THEMIS 607, 615 (1998). 
 184. Concurrently, an inappropriate distinction will be made between 
perpetrators.  Thus, for example, a distinction will arise between 
perpetrators whose victims are able to feel the non-pecuniary injury 
subsequent to the interference with their right to autonomy, and who are 
thus obligated to compensate those victims, and perpetrators whose 
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subjective approach is shown to also create vertical 
incoherence.185 
How can we explain the court’s failure to fully implement 
the Shultz vision in the Ali Daaka case? Similar to the Chappel 
and Chester cases, the Israeli court’s decision in Ali Daaka was 
influenced by the approach stating that a patient who suffered 
from interference with her right to autonomy is to be awarded 
compensation only if she suffered tangible injuries. Although 
the court in Ali Daaka was prepared to compensate the 
plaintiff for the very fact of the interference with her right to 
autonomy, it demanded that the plaintiff establish a tangible 
injury in the form of wounded feelings. Adoption of this 
approach, which specifies that compensation be awarded only 
to patients suffering tangible damage, is related, as we have 
seen, to the use of the tort of negligence as a cause of action. 
An examination of the shortcomings of the approach 
adopted in the Ali Daaka case raises the question of which 
approach the court should have adopted.  Shultz contends 
that in cases of this type—that is, cases where the plaintiff is 
unable to prove that she suffered personal injury as a result of 
the interference with her right to autonomy—the court should 
award her compensation in the form of a global amount whose 
value is to be determined according to one of two criteria: 
either a fixed amount above a nominal sum or an amount 
determined by the jury in consideration of all the 
circumstances of the case.186 Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
derive a comprehensive theory of compensation from Shultz’s 
position. I will now attempt to present such a theory. 
I believe that the court should have adopted an objective-
proprietary approach regarding the damage from interference 
with the patient’s right to autonomy.  According to this 
approach, a victim’s life, her physical integrity, her ability to 
enjoy the amenities of living, her freedom from pain and 
                                                          
victims are unable to do so and are thus free of the same obligation. This 
distinction is inappropriate when considering the possibility that the two 
perpetrators caused identical damage in the nature and severity of their 
interference, performed the same actions and committed the same 
omissions.  It follows that this approach introduces dual incoherence. 
 185. For an argument similar in spirit against the personal-subjective 
approach, see Kyle R. Crowe, The Semantical Bifurcation of Noneconomic 
Loss: Should Hedonic Damage Be Recognized Independently of Pain and 
Suffering Damage?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1275, 1290–91 (1990). 
 186. Shultz, supra note 1, at 290–91 & n.13. 
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suffering, and thus her right to autonomy, are all personal 
properties having value, like a home and its chattel.  To deny a 
patient “property” of this sort implies denial of something for 
which she enjoys “proprietary rights.” Each such “property” 
has a “value” that requires compensation for its loss or 
damage, even if the victim is subjectively unaware of the 
damage and its outcomes, and even if she feels no pain or 
suffering in the injury’s wake.187 
When following this approach, compensation is assessed 
by determining the value of the right of autonomy as an 
amount expressing the right’s objective value to society on the 
one hand, and ascertaining the magnitude of the interference 
with that right on the other.188 The magnitude of the 
interference with the right to autonomy is assessed according 
to all the circumstances of the case,189 including the type and 
scope of information kept from the patient,190 the importance 
of the decision to the patient,191 and the number as well as 
characteristics of available alternative treatments.192 In 
contrast, the intensity of the wounded feelings felt by the 
patient because of the interference with her right to autonomy 
will not be considered a contributing factor and will thus be 
excluded from the compensation assessment.  At the same 
time, I do not deny the possibility of awarding the patient 
additional compensation for her mental anguish. However, the 
                                                          
 187. Comment, Nonpecuniary Damages for Comatose Tort Victims, 61 
GEO. L.J. 1547, 1548–49 (1973); Benedek, supra note 183, at 619–20; 
Graeme Mew, Damages—Personal Injuries—Non-Pecuniary Damages—
Unaware Plaintiff and the Functional Approach, 64 CAN. BAR REV. 562, 
563–64 (1986); A.I. Ogus, Damages for Lost Amenities: For a Foot, a 
Feeling or a Function?, 35 MOD. L. REV. 1, 2 (1972). 
 188. The value of the right of autonomy to society will obviously be 
identical in every case coming before the court.  Differences in the 
compensation awarded will be determined by the distinctive 
circumstances of the injury. 
 189. See Ogus, supra note 187, at 2–3. 
 190. Thus, the greater the amount of information denied the patient 
and the more relevant that information to making a decision, the more 
severe the interference with the patient’s right to autonomy. 
 191. That is, the more important the decision is to the patient and the 
greater the expectation that its implications will be meaningful to her, the 
more severe the interference with her right to autonomy. 
 192. On the approach stating that the greater the number of alternative 
treatments available to the patient and the greater the difference between 
those alternatives, the greater the interference with the patient’s right to 
autonomy, see Twerski & Cohen, supra note 30, at 658–59. 
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award of compensation to the plaintiff should not depend on 
the establishment of tangible-subjective damage. 
In determining the “objective” value of the right to 
autonomy, the court should be swayed by that right’s 
centrality in law and in society.  That is, the court is to 
recognize this right as having more than symbolic value.  It 
thus means that the type of compensation suggested by this 
approach is to be neither symbolic nor nominal, as is 
compensation for the tort of assault, but the compensation 
should still be fitting.193 At the same time, the courts should 
abstain from being excessive in the amounts awarded.194 The 
purpose of recognizing the new head of damage is not to 
“punish” the perpetrator.  We should therefore avoid 
enshrouding compensation with an aura of “retribution,” an 
act that might eventually induce over-deterrence.195 
Adoption of this approach can be supported on several 
grounds. First, as stated, it resists the assessment of 
compensation at a level commensurate with the patient’s 
wounded feelings. Hence, application of this approach is not 
expected to deny the right to compensation to victims who, for 
whatever reason, are unable to sense distress or mental 
anguish as a result of the interference with their right to 
autonomy. 
Second, because compensation will not be assessed 
according to the non-pecuniary outcomes of the interference 
with the right to autonomy, we can expect less weight to be 
given to factors such as the treatment’s successful outcomes 
and whether the plaintiff was able to prove decision causation.  
Adoption of this approach can therefore be expected to prevent 
the award of low compensation to victims only because the 
treatment was occasionally successful or because it was 
assumed that the patient would have agreed to undergo that 
treatment in any case. 
                                                          
 193. I therefore reject the approach implied by Justice Hoffman in the 
Chester decision, according to which the plaintiff is to be awarded a 
meager sum for the interference with the right to autonomy.  See supra 
note 104. 
 194. As we have seen, this approach was adopted by the Court in the 
Ali Daaka case. See CA 2781/93 Ali Daaka v. Carmel Hosp., Haifa [1999] 
IsrSC 53(4) 526, 583. 
 195. Were we to attempt to translate these principles into tangible 
amounts, the minimal sum would be NIS 50,000 (about $15,000) and the 
maximum NIS 300,000 (about $80,000). 
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Third, given that this approach is based on objective 
criteria, it minimizes the difficulties attached to the 
assessment of compensation raised by the approaches based 
on estimating the damage to the victim’s well-being.196 The 
accompanying administrative costs will therefore be much 
lower. 
Fourth, because the amount of compensation to be 
awarded will be fitting as opposed to symbolic, this approach is 
expected to provide appropriate incentives for the presentation 
of claims involving interference with the right to autonomy 
even if this was the sole injury the patient suffered. 
Fifth, the objective approach is not foreign to Anglo-
American law; it has been recognized with respect to such non-
pecuniary damages as loss of the amenities of life and of 
bereavement.197 
After examining the attributes of the objective-proprietary 
approach, I should note that I am not ignoring a potential 
criticism, specifically, the difficulty of assessing compensation 
within its framework. The source of this difficulty lies in the 
nature of the respective “property,” the patient’s right to 
autonomy, which has no market value. In addition, in the 
absence of any other standard for determining the value of this 
property and the degree of harm suffered, we can anticipate 
that compensation will be awarded in arbitrary amounts. 
Even though this is clearly a substantive argument, it 
remains insufficient to justify rejection of the proposed 
approach because similar difficulties arise when applying the 
subjective approach.  According to the subjective approach, 
the court is to assess the degree of damage inflicted on the 
victim’s well-being as a result of the negligence in question in 
addition to quantifying the pecuniary worth of that damage.  In 
the case of interference with a patient’s right to autonomy, the 
court is required to assess the non-pecuniary-subjective 
outcome of the injury in the form of wounded feelings as well 
as assigning them a value. This task is particularly complex 
due to the absence of objective standards for measuring the 
                                                          
 196. This difficulty is inherent in the personal-subjective approach.  
See Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and 
the Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163, 178–79 (2004); Comment, 
supra note 187, at 1553. 
 197. See. e.g., DEAKIN ET AL., supra note 124, at 1002, 1004. 
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said damage, that is, we lack objective standards for assessing 
how much well-being was lost as a result of the negligent 
action and for quantifying the pecuniary worth of that loss.198  
Considerable arbitrariness will therefore characterize the 
compensation assessment from the subjective approach as 
well.199 It follows that the consideration of arbitrariness, in 
itself, cannot justify rejection of the objective approach. The 
choice between the subjective approach and the objective 
approach should, therefore, rest on other considerations as 
discussed previously. As I have shown, these considerations 
lead to the conclusion that the objective approach is the 
desirable one. 
In concluding this section I would like to devote a few 
words to the possibility of assessing compensation according to 
the theory of loss of chance. As we have seen, this theory was 
rejected in the form presented by the plaintiff in the Chappel 
case.200 We have also seen that this theory can be interpreted 
to allow the award of compensation for the very interference 
with the patient’s right to autonomy by presenting the chance 
lost as the probability of the victim making a decision that 
reflects her true wishes and values. If this interpretation is 
correct, why do I reject this theory and retain my preference for 
the objective-proprietary approach? 
My position rests on the Chappel decision, which 
illustrates the problems of applying the theory of loss of 
chance.  This theory invites the jurist to evaluate the 
probability of events transpiring differently from the actual 
events. Such a request risks shifting attention away from the 
interference with the right to autonomy to the lost chance of 
receiving treatment different from that given to the plaintiff 
and to outcomes different from those suffered. 
As stated, the Chappel decision faithfully demonstrates 
these issues. The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s injury 
was actually the lost chance of the surgery being performed 
later and by a different surgeon.201 He would later argue that 
                                                          
 198. See King, Jr., supra note 196; Comment, supra note 187, at 1553. 
 199. Regarding the arbitrariness inherent in the evaluation of 
compensation for non-pecuniary damages suffered by the victim, see 
PETER CANE, ATIYAH’S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 162, 167 
(7th ed. 2006); King, Jr., supra note 196, at 179–80. 
 200. Chappel v. Hart (1998) 195 C.L.R. 232, 236, 278, available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1998/55.html. 
 201. Id. at 237–38. 
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due to the fact that the risk inherent in the procedure was 
identical irrespective of the date of the surgery and the identity 
of the surgeon, the chance lost by the plaintiff would be of 
minimal value.202 Clearly, the defendant had ignored the fact 
that the plaintiff had lost the prospect of making a decision 
that reflected her desire to postpone the surgery, to select a 
different surgeon, and to consider the very desirability of 
performing the surgery at that time, a prospect having value in 
isolation of the risks inherent in each of the options before her.  
Adoption of the objective-proprietary approach avoids such a 
difficulty because it perceives the right to autonomy per se as 
property, and thus as having independent worth. 
An additional problem with the theory of loss of chance is 
the fact that it requires assessment of the of the victim’s lost 
chance. If the damage suffered is treated as the loss of the 
victim’s chance of making a decision that reflects her values 
and wishes, this approach raises the question of what 
proportion of this chance was indeed lost. This question 
cannot be answered until responses are received regarding two 
other questions. First, what is the probability that the patient’s 
decision would reflect her values and wishes had there not 
been a breach of disclosure? Second, to what degree did the 
breach of the duty of disclosure affect this probability? Given 
that a large number of factors are likely to influence the 
patient’s decision, and given that some of them might 
contribute to a situation where the patient’s decision might not 
reflect her values and wishes irrespective of any breach of the 
duty of disclosure, providing an answer to this question is an 
intricate if not impossible mission. This intricacy represents a 
further consideration supporting adoption of the objective-
proprietary approach to the assessment of compensation. 
VII. REES V. DARLINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL NHS 
TRUST—IS THIS WHAT WE HAD HOPED FOR? 
The Rees decision is not a case of informed consent.203 Its 
subject is a negligent case of sterilization that concluded in the 
                                                          
 202. Id. 
 203. Rees v. Darlington Mem’l Hosp. NHS Trust, [2003] UKHL 52, 
[2004] 1 A.C. 309, 309 (U.K), available at 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2003/52.html. 
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birth of a healthy baby.204 Nevertheless, the decision handed 
down by the House of Lords has implications for the current 
discussion. 
 The plaintiff in the Rees case suffered from serious 
health problems.205 Because she felt she would be unable to 
care for a child properly, she requested sterilization.206 She 
subsequently turned to a physician who was employed by the 
defendant while making clear her decision not to conceive.207  
The sterilization was imperfectly performed; the plaintiff later 
became pregnant and gave birth to a normal, healthy child.208  
She then filed a petition for remuneration for the cost of 
raising a child given her special circumstances.  The House of 
Lords, in a majority of four to three, ruled that the plaintiff 
should not be awarded compensation for the full cost of raising 
her unplanned child,209 although they did award her a 
conventional sum of £15,000.210 
 The judges in the majority were convinced that the 
fairness of a rule that denies a plaintiff, the victim of a legal 
tort, any compensation exclusive of remuneration of the costs 
incurred by pregnancy and birth is doubtful.211 The court 
believed they should not ignore the real damage caused the 
parents, especially the mother, under these circumstances.  
Due to another’s negligence, she was denied the opportunity to 
live the life that she wanted and had chosen.212 The plaintiff, 
they continued, had suffered damage to a meaningful aspect of 
her right to autonomy—the right to plan and limit the size of 
her family.213 This right is a significant human right, one that 
requires legal protection in the form of compensation for the 
unique interference with the mother’s right to autonomy. The 
House of Lords supported the approach proposed by Lord 
Millet in Mcfarlane v. Tayside Health Board,214 according to 
                                                          
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 316, 319, 348–49, 354–55. 
 210. Id. at  356. 
 211. Id. at 316–17. 
 212. Id. at 317. 
 213. Id. at 317, 319, 349, 356. 
 214. McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board, [2000] 2 A.C. 59, 114 (H.L.) 
(appeal taken from Scot.) (U.K.). 
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which a conventional sum should be awarded to plaintiffs in 
such cases.215 The amount of compensation set in Rees, the 
stated £15,000,216 was not the product of calculation and was 
not compensatory, the court stressed; its purpose was to 
express the tort suffered by the plaintiff and the interference 
with her right to autonomy.217 
As stated, the Rees decision does not involve a breach of 
the duty of informed consent; rather, it is a case of medical 
malpractice. Moreover, we can explain the court’s decision by 
referring to the exceptional, convoluted issue at hand—award 
of compensation to parents for the cost of raising a healthy 
child. Nevertheless, the decision does provide important 
support for my thesis. First, the House of Lords accepted the 
idea that interference with a person’s right to autonomy 
represents a separate damage that entitles the injured party to 
compensation even in the absence of tangible damage. Second, 
by adopting the objective approach for assessing 
compensation, the House rejected the subjective approach 
taken by the court in the Ali Daaka case. As conceptualized in 
Rees, compensation expressed the injustice done to the victim, 
not to her feelings. 
In consideration of the fact that a person’s right to 
autonomy plays a crucial role in the context of medical 
treatment, the decision in the Rees case is likely to persuade 
other courts to recognize interference with the right to 
autonomy as a compensable damage in the context of the 
doctrine of informed consent. 
Nevertheless, one significant feature does separate the 
approach adopted in the Rees case and my own. As we have 
seen, the amount of compensation to be awarded when 
applying the objective-proprietary approach is expected to 
fluctuate in conjunction with the unique circumstances of 
each case of interference. Yet, in Rees, the House of Lords 
adopted a tariff approach. In contrast to the objective-
proprietary approach that assigns a monetary value to the 
victim’s loss based on the particular circumstances of the case, 
                                                          
 215. Rees, [2004] 1 A.C. at 317 (citing McFarlane, [2000] 2 A.C. at 114). 
 216. This award is higher than that offered by Lord Millet in the 
McFarlane decision, which amounted to only £5,000, based on the 
argument that expression should be given to the wrong done as well as to 
achieve some degree of justice. Id. 
 217. Rees, [2004] 1 A.C. at 316–37, 319, 349–50, 356. 
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the tariff approach assigns a uniform and permanent monetary 
value to all instances of interference.218 Accordingly, a 
standard “price,” known in advance, is to be attached to this 
interference, making it unnecessary for the court to make a 
case-by-case determination of the correct damage or its 
outcomes.219 
It therefore appears that while we can expect these two 
approaches to prevent the difficulties inherent in the subjective 
approach (i.e., the unjustified denial of compensation to 
selected types of victims and the award of small amounts of 
compensation in cases where the victim did not suffer tangible 
damage or is unable to prove decision causation), they remain 
distinct in everything touching upon assessment of the 
compensation. The question remaining before us pertains to 
which of these approaches is preferable in cases of interference 
with the right to autonomy. 
The advantage of the tariff approach is embodied in its 
simplicity. When following this approach, the court is not 
required to determine the severity of the interference.  
Compensation is limited to awards in stipulated amounts.  
Hence, the tariff approach has two major advantages: first, 
lower administrative costs;220 second, certainty regarding the 
anticipated amount of compensation. Due to this certainty, 
one can expect a rise in the number of compromises and thus 
a reduction in the number of petitions and, eventually, 
administrative cost savings.221 
Despite these advantages, I believe it unwarranted to 
prefer the tariff approach to the objective-proprietary approach 
when determining compensation in the wake of interference 
with the right to autonomy. As some of the judges party to the 
Rees decision noted, the tariff approach is quite arbitrary.222 
Its application is likely to conclude in the award of an 
invariable amount of compensation, as stipulated by law, to all 
victims, without differentiating between the circumstances or 
the severity of the interference. 
                                                          
 218. See Alan J. Weisbard, Informed Consent: The Law’s Uneasy 
Compromise With Ethical Theory, 65 NEB. L. REV. 749, 763 (1986). 
 219. Id. For an argument that this approach influenced the judges in 
the Chappel case, see Waddams, supra note 93, at 7. 
 220. See Ogus, supra note 187, at 12–13. 
 221. See CANE, supra note 199, at 167; King, Jr. supra note 196, at 
196–97; Waddams, supra note 93, at 7–8. 
 222. Rees, [2004] 1 A.C. at 319, 335. 
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Given that, several disadvantages can be attributed to the 
tariff approach. To begin with, perpetrators will be charged 
with compensating victims in amounts either above or below 
the value of the actual damage they caused, practices that are 
likely to induce over- or under-deterrence. In addition, because 
some victims will be awarded compensation above the value of 
the damage they suffered and others compensation below that 
value, this approach’s application is expected to distort the 
incentives encouraging patients to file for damages. That is, 
some patients will be dissuaded from filling petitions by 
inadequate incentives, whereas others will be stimulated by 
exaggerated incentives, with the attendant implications of 
under- or over-deterrence and rising administrative costs.  
Lastly, this approach does not accord with considerations of 
corrective justice, which require charging the perpetrator for 
compensation that accurately reflects the harm caused. 
The objective-proprietary approach therefore remains the 
preferable approach. No doubt this approach is characterized 
by some degree of arbitrariness as well because the respective 
“property” is the “patient’s right to autonomy,” a good lacking 
any market value. And so, in the absence of any other 
standard for evaluating this property and the amount of 
damage done, we can expect the compensation awarded to be 
arbitrary, with all the negative implications. Yet, because this 
approach encourages consideration of the circumstances of the 
interference and the degree of damage done, this approach 
better equips us to express the severity of the interference 
while differentiating between diverse victims and perpetrators.  
The comparative level of inherent arbitrariness appears, then, 
to be lower. 
VIII.  THE THESIS – SUMMARY 
Now, after traveling the long road that began with Shultz’s 
excellent article and ended with a review of the innovative 
decision handed down by the House of Lords in the Rees case, 
I can summarize the main points of my thesis. 
First, the law should recognize a new head of damage of 
interference with the right to autonomy.  Under this heading, a 
patient who has suffered interference with her right to 
autonomy will be eligible for compensation regardless of 
whether she suffered a physical injury as a result of medical 
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treatment and whether she can establish decision causation.  
Nevertheless, there is nothing in this new head of damage to 
prevent such a plaintiff from also receiving compensation for 
the tangible injuries she suffered. In other words, 
compensation for interference with the right to autonomy will 
not replace compensation for physical injury suffered by the 
victim as a result of that interference; it can only supplement 
it.223 
Second, assessment of the amount of compensation to be 
awarded for the damage of interference with right to autonomy 
is to be conducted according to the objective-propriety 
approach. Assessment of compensation is therefore to be 
based on the damage suffered to the victim’s “property” (i.e., 
her right to autonomy), rather than any injured feelings. 
Entitlement to compensation is thus independent of the 
plaintiff’s awareness of the interference with this right. 
Treatment success and absence of decision causation 
represent only two of a set of factors to be considered by the 
court when assigning the amount of compensation to be 
awarded. Furthermore, the amount of compensation will be 
determined according to the value of the right to autonomy on 
the one hand, and the circumstances of the said interference 
on the other, a strategy that will introduce variety in the 
amount of compensation to be awarded in each case. The 
principle guiding this assessment of compensation would be 
assignment of an appropriate rather than a symbolic amount. 
Third, legislation should make available a new and 
independent cause of action for patients claiming interference 
with their right to autonomy. This cause of action can be 
attached to standing legislation dealing with patients’ rights or 
                                                          
 223. As we have seen, this is the position taken by the court in the Ali 
Daaka case.  See supra note 169 and accompanying text. I adopt the 
same position.  The question of whether we should limit the patient’s right 
to compensation to the damage of interference with his right to autonomy, 
or compensate her for the physical injuries she suffered as well, goes 
beyond the scope of this article because it raises issues different from 
those discussed here. I will limit myself to noting that some scholars are 
convinced that in the majority of cases exhibiting the absence of informed 
consent, the patient should not receive compensation for the physical 
injury suffered as a result of interference with her right to autonomy and 
that we should limit the right to compensation to the damage of 
interference with that right.  See, e.g., Twerski & Cohen, supra note 30, at 
609, 648, 662; Jackson, supra note 131. 
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introduced into legislation dealing with physicians’ liability; on 
the basis of such laws, patients will be able to obtain 
compensation for any of the injuries suffered or for all of them, 
i.e., the interference with the right to autonomy as well as the 
other tangible injuries suffered as a result. 
It is important to note that the Rees decision indicates the 
possibility of introducing rules such as I have suggested 
regarding the damage of interference with the right to 
autonomy and its compensation under the heading of the tort 
of negligence. Although such steps are possible, they require 
awareness of the necessity and willingness to distance 
ourselves from the characteristics of the tort of negligence and 
its traditional role with respect to claims of medical 
malpractice. However, it is doubtful whether the courts are 
amenable to doing so, or are even aware of the need to do so.  
These constraints are indicated by the fact that even in the 
Chester decision, handed down after the Rees decision, the 
House of Lords made little use of the solution offered in the 
Rees decision. The court in the Chester decision could have 
followed the Rees decision and ruled that the plaintiff was not 
entitled to compensation for the physical injury she had 
suffered in the absence of causation, but that she was entitled 
to compensation for the interference with her right to 
autonomy. As we have seen, the court did not follow this path 
but focused, for reasons described previously, solely on the 
physical injury suffered. 
It appears, then, that the legal approach most appropriate 
is creation of a new and independent legal framework for the 
protection of patients’ right to autonomy. 
The Shultz’s article, together with the Chappel, Chester, Ali 
Daaka and Rees decisions, represent important milestones in 
the development of the doctrine of informed consent, and the 
recognition of the right to autonomy as an independent 
interest having legal salience. Nevertheless, despite the long 
road traveled by the law, it has still not reached its destination. 
My proposal represents, I am convinced, an important step 
toward completion of this journey. 
 
